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The author or this thesis has made a s1noere effort to 
organize the important facts relative to the Peaee Pact ot 
Paris. Early modern peace movements have been brietly 
noted, as they might have a bearing on the historical back-
ground. 
special e·tfort has been made to show the m.otives 
which prompted each nation that had a part in the negotia-
tions. The1r reservations a.re discussed in the light ot the 
me8lling which they give the Paot . ~hile the attitude ot 
certain nations is reflected in their correspondence, the 
writer avoids any display of personal prejudice . 
As the instrument for renunciation or war went into 
effect and the conduct of some indicated a violation of the 
spirit of the treaty, the lack of speoitic sanctions became 
apparent. Although cooperation of effort to preserve peace 
has been strengthened through consultation. the present 
outlook 1s not bright. 
To name ll the sources from lhich help was received 
would be 1mposGible, but grateful aclmo ledgment is made to 
br. E. F. //illis, -of the History Department I for his sympa-
thetic attitude and valuable criticisms; also to iiss Grace 
Campbell and iss Margaret Walters or the Oklahoma A. and M. 
Library tor aid in securing material. 
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Chapter 1 
liistorical Background 
From the earliest beginnings ot society war has been 
used Without question and almost without interval. It has 
served as the basis upon which modern nations were formed.l 
· though civil war has been suppressed, the right to declar~ 
war as admittedly the right of any sovere1gn state. . Na-
tional armies nd navies then, even in time ot peac.e. con-
tinue to determine not o.nly the character o'f nations them.-
selves but also the status of nations in their .relationship 
to one another.2 
The proposal, then, to renounce war as an instrument or 
national policy, reaches into the heart or a complex proble, 
sinc·e it has played a benetioent role in history as well as 
a criminal .one. here ould this or any other nation be if 
it had not at times used force to assert its determination 
to maintain those institutions ihich embody its political 
career? 
It the _principles ot reform v411eh eliminate violence 
rrom the calculation-or statesmen is to be achieved, the 
complex nature or the proble must be recognized.3 
l dames T. Shotwell, , ar as an Instrument or National 
Policy and Its Renuncia.tioninthePact of Paris(New York: 
Harcourt'-;-Bre.oe and Company, ~gl§T, "p7"""e:-
2 !bid., p. 14. -
3 Ibid., pp. 15- 16. -
1 
Leaving out the medieval and earl:r modern schemes for 
the preservation or peaoe, the movement may· be consieered 
to have begun. immediately tollowlng the !'fapoleonio Wars. 
llzr 1815 three npeaee societies" exist-ed in the United Ste.tea. 
Organizations for the promotion of peace on moral. and reli• 
gious grounds soon appeared 1:n other eou.ntries. I.n 183? 
William Ladd proposed a '"Court ot Nations" .tor th$ arbl tra-
tion of all international disputes, but the Preaide.nt failed 
to act on the congressional resolution. 
The movement beoam:e recognized as internation.al in t;he 
"'First General Peace Convent.ion" held in London, England, in 
1843. Other peace congresses ware held in Paris in 1849, 
Franktert i.n 18!50, London in 1851., and :Ma.nche·ster and Edin-
burg in 1655 .. This series of congresses eame to an end 
during the mid-eentury wars in Europe end the United States .. 
A second phase of the move.men t began about 1867 when 
the f~Ligue de la Pa.ix" was founded in Paris. 0th.er .n.ew 
peaoe societies began and o.ld ones reorganized.. The social-
ist and humanitarian grou:ps gave strength to the new or.gan1• 
zations and t-he movement beeam.e less eeelesia-stical. More 
attention was given to disarmament and to the project of a 
"United States of Europett sponsored by the ~Geneva League 
tor J?eace and Liberty. tt Mew demands tor tlw arbitration ot 
dis11utes.cr:.une as a result ot the Franoo-Prussian War. Inter-
national coD3resses were resumed a.nd the movement assumed a 
world wide scope,. '?he "Interparliamentarr Un1o.nn began in 
1889, and annual peiu)e eongresses held meetings in many 
2 
lands. In 1899 the First Hague Conference was oalled.4 
With the opening or the twentieth century definite 
moves were made to substitute pao1fio rather than military 
eans of settling disputes • . Notable among these ere the 
so-called Root, treaties in 1908 between the United States 
and leading European countries. By these treaties certain 
differences which 1ght arise between the United States and 
the nation involved -ere to be settled by submitting the 
question to a Permanent Court or Arbitration. It w snot 
mandatory that the decisions be accepted. The treaties 
were considered so successful, however, that they ere re-
newed at the eX1)1rat1on of their :t'ive year period in 1913 
and again in 1918. 
~he complete outlawry of ar was first suggested by 
.Saimon O. Levinson, a Chicago lawyer. 5 The appaal to torce 
between nations as well as individuals is intolerable and 
should be outla ed. ·1 r bet een nations should be abolished 
as an institution.a The movement to outlaw war received 
support by statesmen in different nations. On November 11, 
1921, President Harding said, 
There must be, there shall be, the commanding 
voice ot a conscious civilization against armed 
warrare.7 
' 4 Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics (New 
York: McGraw-Rill Book Company, 193!), p. 6!§. 
5 Salmon o. Levinson, "The Legal Status or- ar," 
Republic, IV (!I.arch 9, l.918), 171-173. 
Ne -
6 Salmon o. Levinson, "Outlawry of ar,ff 
ment 115, 67 Cong .. , 2 Sess., p. 3. -
7 Ibid. , p .• 4. -
Senate Docu---- -
3 
uoting from Lloyd George in Great Britain's Peaoe 
~ s, June, 1918, 
Above all, making sure that war shall be henee-
torth declared a crime punishable by the law ot 
nations.a 
rihile in Detroit arsha.ll Foch on ,. ovember ? , 1921, 
s id, 
iar in 1tselr and tor 1tselt is the. greatest 
orime. in the world and the glory ot victory pursued 
tor itself is a crime .. This orld 1s made tor peace 
and tor work in peace time. The first duty is to 
work tor our people, not to tight.9 
ltith the backing or these and other .leading statesmen, 
r . Levinson formulated hist elve point plan to outlaw 
tar . lO 
It is thus seen that the early advocates ot· outlawry 
or war proposed to reach their goal or a world without war 
si ply by making it a public cr1 e.ll 
he outlawry or aggressive wart re atteotin either 
territorial or political independence or all oountries was 
one or Woodrow ilson's cherished ideals. He voioad the 
matter in his obile speech in 1915 and later mentioned it 
in his address at the second Pan- erican Sc1ent1fic Congress 
at lash1ngton in 1916-1917. During this oonterence he had 
caused to be prepared the draft of treaty 
a~., p. 4. 
9 Ibid., p. 6 .. 
10 Ibicl., p. 9. 
ose third 
ll Frank • Russell, Theories ot Intern tional Relations 
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, !936), p. 357. 
4 
article was regard.ea. by hirn as so im:po:rtant that 1 t was 
hter inserted in. the .draft ()f the Covenant of the League 
o:r Nations without essential modtiioations.12 
lf' no nu.tion v;ere to eomll'dt an aggression, that is,. 
atte.ek another nation, other thun in self-defense, it ts 
evident that there would be no wars of conquest. Then, too, 
the peaceful settlement of d1.spu.tas and obligations on the 
part ot League us.embe.rs 111as intended to establish the reign 
of law and peace• with force to be em.ployed. only in tbe 
service or 'both. It was doubtless Wilson's belief that. the 
covenant ~-:ould usher in an era ot peace if it were observed. 
Many believed that tbis treaty, w.ith its provisions tor 
peaceful settlement, :providing for a Pe.:rm~ent Court ot 
International .Justice, would surely bring T{orld Peaoe.1:5 
One might tl1ink that tbe Oovenunt ot the League of 
ttations, solemnly a.coepted by, the :majority o:r nations, 
'WOttld influence and control their conduct, making evident 
in their relations with one another a new and superior inter-
national. life,. But within a few years the Geneva Protocol 
renouneed aggresslon, an .aet wh.ieh would seem to have been 
outlawe-d ~1.tb. $Ufi:ieient clarity in the Covenant., and ex-
pressed u renewed determination to banish agt;ression as well 
as. war from. the world;. Great Britain's final rejection of 
·------------------------------
12 Carnegie Endowment tor International Peace-, 
B~~ (Washington, 1954}, p. 98. . · 
Year -· 
15 l"'i.d n na 
. f,J rrnetv~'·· • X.l • ti ... 
.5 
the Protocol. although lnt~nded to render effective the 
Covenant, remained but e. proposa.1.14 
The failure ot the Frotoeol :resulted in the :making of 
t,he Tres:ty or Locarno, or the ti ve power Pact i.n which the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, France, c;ermany, and Ita:l,.y a.greed 
:not to resort to aggressive vmrfare but subr.i t iill of their 
di.spute.s whieh di1;:,l0tr!a.ey !'ailed to adjust t.o Judicial decd-
sion, to conc1liatlon, o:r ev~ntua1l}r to t.he Council ot the 
League of I!ationa .15 This ag1·ee1nen t we.a eon eluded on 
October lo, 1925 .. 
He1""e are a series of troa.tiea mH.cle by members ot the 
League primarily intended to prevent aggressive v,a.r, yet 
the Covenant hc..d already bound t:he members of tha Let1gue 
Hto respect and :preserve as against internal aggression the 
\ 
te.1"rito:rial integrity and existing ;political iwle:pendence 
of the . members of t.he teague. 0 
on April o, 1927, the tenth anniversary o.f the entrance 
or t.he United States int.:> the tlo:rld Wa.r, M. :Briand, :!?renclt 
Minister or l"oreign .Affairs. ;me,de a statement to the. 1\Sso-
~iated Freas Correspondent in Paris suggesting that the 
United Sta't.ea and 17'rance enter into a t1utual agreement to 
denounce war as an instrument ::,f national policy in their 
dealings with one another'. A signit1ce.nt :part of this mes-
sage addressed to the A.me:rioan public appears a.a follows: 
l.4 !bid.' 
~ 
p .. 99. 
15 Ibid. p. 99. 
__ , 
,I 
It there were need tor those two great democracies 
to give b.igb testi ony to, thelr desire tor peace and 
~o furnish to other peoples an example more solemn 
still, France would be willing to subscribe publicly 
1th the United States to any mutual engagement tending 
'to outlaw war,• to use an American expression, as be-
tween these two countries. The renunciation ot war 
e.s an instrument of national policr is e. conception 
already familiar to the signatories to the Covenant 
of the League of Nations and the Treaties ot Loo rno. 
Every engagement entered into in this spirit by the 
United States oward nother nation such as Franee 
would contribute greatly in the eyes ot the world to 
broaden and strengthen the foundations on b.ieh the 
international policy or peace is being erected. These 
two ~reat friendly nations. equally devoted to the 
oauaa of peace. would turnish to the world the best 
illustration of the truth that the immediate e , d to 
be obtained is not s.o muon d1Sarllament as the praot1-
ea.l application of peace itsel.t .. 16 
In the latter part or 1926 Nicholas urray Butler with 
istide Brian·d disouased tb.a ·book, Qg_ ~, by Karl Clause-
witz. During the oonvers tton Butler suggested that the 
renunci tion or ar bet een the American and renoh Govern·-
ments ould be fine step. ~The toundationa tor the Pact 
or Paris renouncing war as an instrument or n t1onal pollo,y 
had been laid in his mind."1'1 
'· Brland's offer as probably further inspired by a 
eonversat1on which he had on Jareb 22, 1g27, with J' es T. 
Shotwell. a professor or Columbia University and an ardent 
advocate of peace. Bet een then and April 6, the tenth 
anniversary at the entrance or the United States into the 
16 James 'r. Shotwell, ttThe Pact o.t Paris," ·International 
Cone1.l1ation No . 243, (October, 1928), 27. · 
17 Nicholas urray Butler,~ am.ill 2!_ Nations (Ne 
York: Charles Saribner's Sons, l'i:138), p. o. 
'I 
forld ar he framed his message.18 
Strange as it may seem. the otter of Briand to the 
American publ1e hieh appeared. without comment in the New 
York Times on Apr11 6, 1927, attracted little or no atten-
i1on in the United ~tates generally, for some time. It 
seemed that America had missed the point. The diplomacy 
was too open and lacking in mystery to ttract the attention 
or the press. Briand must have telt disappointed at the 
lack ot results from bis message. Since there had been no 
direct oomm.unication to Washington, the Department of' State 
paid no attention to the message.lg 
The first American to cause the Briand otter to attract 
attention in the United States was Dr. Nicholas l..tnrray 
Butler. On April 25, the New York Times published his 
letter together with a republication or the otter of • 
ollowing is Dr. Butler•s letter: 
Is it possible that the American people tailed 
to her the extraordinarily important message d-
dressed to them through the Associated Press on 
pril 6 by x . Briand, . ' inister of Foreign lift irs in 
the Government or the French Republic It not, what 
a.nsier do t.a.~ey propose to ke, and ho long ,ill 
they perm1 t . Briand to be kept waiting tor that 
ans rer? 
Cn ; pril 6,197. the tenth anniversary of the 
form.al entry ot the United States into t.he /orld 
·w , the _ oreign Minister of runce ma.de a public 
proposal to the American people that 1s quite with-
out pa.ra.llel in our history. He formally and openly 
proposed a treaty between the lJnited States and France 
18 David H. :111er, The Peaoe Pact of Paris {New York: 
G:. P. Putnam• s Sons, 1928),p. 'l. - -
19 !!:!.!g,., P· a. 
8 
that would definitely renounce war as a remedy tor 
real or tanoied wrongs as between France and the 
United States. This is a proposal to ·toutlaw' war 
t-hat has every merit of praeticallty. For some rea-
son which is hard to understand, the lmportanoe or 
this notable decl ration appears not to have been 
understood, mueh less appreciated, in the United 
States. 
This epoch-making ofter was not made confiden-
tially through ordinary diplomatic channels, but was 
contained in a public declaration and appeal to the 
people of the United States in a tormal statement 
giTen to the Associated Press. 'France is willing, t 
says • Briand in that statement, 'publiely to en-
gage ·itself w1 th the United States to put war as be-
tween the two countries outside the pale ot the law.' 
Any-one who knows what is the practice ot the 
French Government in respect to publie ministerial 
declarations or any- kind will realize that this is 
no 1rrespons1ble or erely rhetorics.! appeal. • 
Briand deals here not with general theories of world 
peace or with plans that can be brought to pass in a 
distant future; he proposes a de1'1n1te step to be 
taken at once and he is still waiting tor eTldenoe or 
understanding on the part of the American people. Ifo 
French K1n1ster eTer speaks in terms like these un-
less he has previously gained the f'ull support or the 
Cabinet or which .he ls a menber. It is French govern-
mental practice not to make pronouncement on an im-
portant question or public policy until that pronounce-
ment has been a.coepted by the GOTernment ot the day. 
en a French Minister J11B.kes declaration or policy 
auoh as this, it ls the Government ot France which is 
speaking. 
Why- should not the American. people hasten to use 
every means at their command to assure the GoYernment 
of France that they have heard, that the7 do under-
stand, and that they will act 1n accordance with this 
progressive and constructive policy? The adhesion 
and cooper tion of other powers would, or course, be 
seoure,d later on, but the first thing is to act, and 
unless the erican people are both physically and 
morally dear. they will hear and act qu1ck1y. 
One ho read.s M. Briand• s statement will see how 
clearly he sees the limitations under which the 
present negotiations for disarmament are being carried 
on. Those limitations arise chietly trom questions 
of procedure or method~ and yet they reflect the great 
fundamental ditterences h1oh every negotiation must 
9 
race. Disarmament, as • . Briand truly says, co 
onl1 tallow from. the existence ot a will to peace 
among the nations of the e1vil1zed 0.rld. Let France 
and America, be cries, demonstrate that, as between 
themselves at least, that will exists and w111 be 
finally and forma.111 recorded in public act • • • • 
The tact that this statement is addressed to the 
American public instead ot formally to the OoTern-
ment at i a.sh1ngton rather increases than lessens 
its importance. The ethod adop~ed by M. Briand is 
titting and proper in these demooratie days to ascer-
tain whether the will to peace really exists among 
the people or the United States and the people or 
France with ref'e:tenoe to their mutual. rel tions. 
The appeal was primarily not to governmental action, 
but tlrst of all to those moral forces to wbloh • 
Briand makes appeal QO not really exist mong us, or, 
if existing, they cannot secure such direction of 
our policies as shall realize these ideals. then in 
international relations we shall have reached a 
stage which no American wbo understands his country's 
traditions d who realizes his countq's idea.ls can 
look upon ithout shame and sorrow • 
• Briand's mind is thoroughly practical. He 
does not ask the Gov,ernmen.t or the United States to 
accept the covenant o,r the League ot Nations ; tle 
does not ask the Government or the United States to 
adhere to the protocol ror the establishment or a 
Permanent Court ot International J"ustioe. All tha't 
he .asks ia that the people of the United States shal.l 
take their own way to enforce their policies with 
reference to France. 
r•e have b.een celebrating, and finally and justly 
celebrating, the tenth anniversary of the entr1 ot 
the United States into the orld ar. ~here and ho 
could we tind a more titting tribute to the memory 
or those whose lives were given up in that s.tupendous. 
struggle than by making a solemn compact with that 
nation most seTerely stricken by that war tor the 
definite and ror.me.1 renunciation or war itself as an 
instrument of policy. 
M. Briand, speaking the voice and expressing the 
soul ot rranee, has called out to us across the ocean. 
1Yhat answer is he to hear? What evidence is he to 
have that tl5se noble words have been heard and 
understood? 
20 Nicholas Murray Butler, Ne !2,t! Times, April 25, 
1927. 
10 
As Briand. had addres.sed his message to tb.e 1~erioan 
JUblio it is not surprising that the response \Vhioh he re-
~eived 1n the suooeeding months from the United States wa.s 
still mot-e significant and irt::.portant in revealing the will 
of the people to a poli.ey favoring the great experiment of 
renouncin&.; war. nrue United Stntes could (JO as far as 
France in ways ot peace."21 
frevious to the Briand proposal .\merica1:1s were in the 
habit ot thinking of ths ::?ranee or tbe Third Republic as a 
militaristic nation. t:itll the affair of .April 6 came the 
first definite step toward a revision of the attitude. 
tovmrd i~ranoe. Jut. the o.hange did not come about all at 
once. h'riand was aware of the feeling that the people ot 
the United States might not appreciate the genuineness of 
.his offer. In conversation he stated frankly that he did 
not understand .iiuneriean publ.1o opinion, nor what to make of 
it. At tl1is point rtr. Levinson, the originator ot tho phrase 
ttoutlawry or war, ff and a great pro,pontmt o:r :renunoiat1e:n ot 
v1u, arrived in Paris. Re was of great service in inter ... 
pre ting to Europe and i:U.~er.ioa the program of war outlawry. 22 
In order to bring the matter more directly to the atten-
tion ot t.ne people in the United States, l'osaph P.. Chamber ... 
lain and James i. Shotwell wrote up a draft of a treaty 
21 Shotwell, 11:a:r .!! !!! ~nS}_trwnent ;~~ National f..<?liol.-
p;p .. 44-45. 
22 Ibid np 45 ... 4,'1· • ..._,., ¥ • 
11 
which would embody the principles of the French proposa.1.23 
The ta.et th;at this treaty was co:pi ed and con11:nentad on in 
many newspapers showed & 15reat interest 1.n the p:ro_posal to 
:renouno.s war. The mol"e oonservative papers ridiculed the 
proposal., but their ar·tioles were not eopied by tb.e small 
town ne1'1spapers of tlle Middle ~rest which had. :t\.1rnislled t.he 
greatest opposition to th,a entrance ot th$ 'United States 
into the. League of Uations. r:rbe :proposal itself v1as izi 
accord with 8:n 14eal over ·ti\hich th.ere w·as practically no 
difterenee of opinion.. The doubt was \Vhettter or not the 
ideal could be embodied in definite workable terms .. The 
The Draft-1!-reaty seemed to assure rr.ost :people that the 
Briand proposal ,,aa SOJ!!et,hir.1.g real tor ·which. there \•;ere 
det!nite praeedents in the Root, Knox, Bry3.li.., and Locarno 
treaties.. Its importenee, therefore, rr£0/ be stated in tbs 
tact that it broueht the pr~pesal to renounee wa:r into the 
sphere of :praeti.eal disou.$aion.24 
1Ve must have in mind that up to this point no otfioial. 
correspondence bet1i1een t.he French and Unit·ed States govern-
ments had taken place. Fubl1o opinion was being mobilized 
in favor of an ideal. En:.0:ouraged by the trend. of events, 
M. Briand Ir.ta.de inquiry iE1S to whether the Dor;art.ment ot Sta.te 
tlid or did not d~sire a trea..ty along the line suggested, and 
if it did, whet.her it was .not tar th-e two governments oon-
.23 Shot·well, War as an Instrument ot National Poli.oz, 
Appendix l, pp. 2•it=!'la. - · · ·.· - · 
24 Shotv,ell, -~ ~ llll Instrum,nt of' National P,olio1, 
pp. 5.4 ... 55. 
12 
June ll 
In ::response t.o an i:n:,tormril inqui:ey m:1Jle 011 Sune 
$eoond by M.. Bri&nd J Foreign Mi:.i,ist.or- of Frunee, 
through .lairw Herrick, tnc, tx:10ric.:::.n ';,i:r.hassudor, tho 
latter has been authorized to say to Briand that 
the United i3tates 0will be please<l to engage izL di:Jlo-
matlc c,)nversations on tbe subj0ct of a possible 
a,g;recne:nt alo:ng the 11:neis indir.:.o.tod by • Eli~'ltP 2 
statemen:t to the press on April sixth last. ,::.5 
!u"tiele I. Tlie High Con:traeti:i::1.g Iioi;;.rere Soler.r..11ly 
deolur.:i, in the ne.:me of' the French people and the 
people of the U11i ted States of 5Jlla:r·iea tl1at they con-
tlem:n r<zaourse· to wai" as an inst1~trn1e1.rt or thei:r· nation.al 
policy toward eaeb cJther. 
Art i(}le II. Tb.e settlement or solu t,.ion ot all 
dispu.terJ or conflicts of tihiitsofl~rer :nature or of 
wi1atever ori€[;in t;uey ma,y be, whic:b may arise bet.wean 
-----~~-·-it·-·-··-------
26 ~tL Briand., ''Draft of :Paet of Perpetual. :l?riendship 
'bet\'feen Jrr,'lll:ce and the tTn.:tted States, n Treat tor the Re-
. - .. ·-~"'J!"';"" 
nunoi~i,,.2.!_1 of ~' :Pttblioation .NcL. 468 .. .'iashi11gton: Un:l.ted 
States Govern:ment Pri.ntin.g Office, l'9Z3J, p. 10., (Thia 
publ1ea.tion. is a compi.lation or th<:3 text of the treaty, 
notes exohring.ed, 1:nst . rum.ent.s 01' ra.tifiotition and othe.r 
papers. . lt \Vill be referred to hereafter .a.s Fublie1:1tion 
r~o. 4.68.) 
15 
France an.d the United States of ·Amerioa, shall never 
be sougs:it by either side exoept by paoif1e means. 27 
.fort;totten in otfioial c ireles during the suro.rmer. 'I'he clam.or 
th ·tho right ot 
of t,ha 
ta 1;1otive in 
~xtension to the United. Dta.tes .of the principl~t 'tf,'h:ich France 
27 This and othe:i:' translations used ~.re those of the 
Department ot State. 
·.t:,8: ,3hotwell, V.'al"' es; an Jnstrwx~en.t of !Jestion:1t.l :Poliel, ~""''~··-~--- -,.11, Q*P.-~·~~- -
p .. 7?. 
14 
contribute greatly in the eyes of th.a 'world to broaden and 
&t:rengt.tuui the foundation or· the policy upon wb.iob. the policy 
(pf 'Vil::)rld pe~1oe was being ereoted. 29 
15 
ChaJ?ter ll, 
Development ff!!. the Elli 
During the summer and fall of 1;27 bile public opinion 
in tha United. States was being developed in t'avor or uneri-
oan entrance into an a ree ant to renounce war n instru-
mentor national policy, nothing was said on the subject in 
the dipl,oma.tic circles at Washington . There see ed to be 
an air of mystery even about the Briand letter of June 20.l 
By Dee$mber, however, when congress convened, the question 
of the French otrer was brought into govermnental circles. 
In the Un ted States Senate, on December 8, Arthur Capper, 
Sen tor .from Kansas, intro ueed resolution providing for 
renune1 tion or war a a.n in.strum.en t or national policy and 
the settlement ot disputes by peacetul methods.2 just f'ou.r 
day 1 ter Senator Borah from Idaho introduced a similar 
resolution. 3 
The rising tide or public opinion, together with these 
and other resolutions, 1s directly responsible. tor further 
ne otiations. It was believed by some in Washington that 
the interval or more than six months before ,. Briand's 
letter was answered s due to keen-sighted deteotion of 
designs on the part ot France to make the United States her 
l Shotwell, War !!. ~ Instr9!ent £! -ational Poliol, 
p. 93. . 
2 Senate J'o1nt Resolution No . 14 , 70 Cong., 1 Sess., 
p. :,51. 
S ~- • p . 477 .. 
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alJ.T 1n European adventure;:;;~ '!his obJeotion does .not seem 
:real in view of the fact that the Un.1ted State$ eGuld have 
ema,loyed th·e Sat.Ile device used in the :m.u1t11ateral tre.at:,, 
nuely, "libEJrty of act:ion,u in case another signatory goe$ 
to war. ii. Briand was too shreWd a stateaman to propose 
impesaibili.tles 1n 41:plomacy, and he knew as well as anyone 
·that .no eoutr.y could bring 1-unerica: to her aid in. ~.a im-
perialistic adventure. Bis of:ter was made to the Utli·tttd 
States alone beeaus• e-xistine; conditions had been suc.n as 
to make war with tb.e tw0 republics extr~mely unlikely .. 4 
On December 28, 192'1, Secretary of State Frank B. 
Kellogg ·acknowledged the receipt ot M. Briand's ofter ot 
June 20 in which he set forth the position of the United 
States on the subject of a treaty renoan-oing war as$ 
instrument ot national polie7,. Re pointed out that 
in view of the traditional triendship between France 
and the United States - and i:o. view of the common 
desire of the two mit1ons never to resort to ams in 
the settlement of sue:h controversi,es as may possibly 
arise between them - it has ocou:rred to me that tb.e 
two governments, instead or contenting themselves 
with a b1lat,eral deolaration ,o:t tl1e nature suggested 
by M. Briand, might make a more signal eontributioa 
t-o "tn>rld peaee by joining in an etfort to obtain the 
adherence or all of the princ ipe.l Powers of the ll.iOrld 
tei a. deelaration renounein~ war as an instrument of 
national policy.I 
Kellogg continues by stating th.at such a declaration 
adhered to b7 t,ll the principal powers would furnish a mueh 
4 Shotwell, "'The Pao·t of Paris,'' International Oon.cilia.-
tion No. 243, (Oetober, l.928), lZ. · · · 
5 "'fhe. Secretary ot State (Kellogg) to the Freneh 
Am.bassad.er {Claudel} /i Publication No. 468, p .. 11. 
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more impressive example to the v,,orld th.an an a.rrangeme:r.1.t be-
tween only tvvo powers such as France and the United States. 0 
Probably the most important fact regarding th.e Kellogg 
pro;posal was that it wr1.s the first time in seven year.s that 
the United States hs.d offered a oonstructi ve poliey re-
garding world })Ol.itios generally. 7 
lJnited. States entered into sueh an. agreement with !'ranee 
England, .Japan., or almost any other nation.. So far as the 
Ultited States vt'a$J eoneerned, th.is treaty with France ,vould 
i!l:volve otl1er treati ea, .so why should not F:ran.ee also be-
Qoma involved~ The i\.merioan governm.ent believed that the 
eonee.ri·tion .should be extended to ltll n,ations of the ,.-10:r.ld 
s.o that its declaration eoulr.i bee.o:me a pa.rt ot international 
la'lfJ and form a f'oundiation tor ·,µ,~orld pee,..e0.9 
The poli t.ieal signifieane~ o:t th.e Kellogg note wae of 
great importance; 1 t b.ad a.gs.in ple,ced the United ;3tates in 
a po.sitlon of maltlng a definite :proposal pointing toward 
world peace; it tended to satisfy e1."'itics of the attitude ot 
tbe United States toward the League of l'!ations; and it 
6 Ibid •• p. 12. 
~
? Miller t .~~ ~ }:~e:f! £!. !!!ri~, p. 15. 
8 Ibid., p. le. 
9 no:rtio1a.l Text of the Kellogg Treaty, .r 9ongres@!On.al 
Digestt (December, 1928}, 358. 
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seem.ea. to satisfy attvooat~.es o:r the theory of 1routla1\TY ot 
war .. ,t Internationally, the .Kellogg proposal ~"Fis diEloussed 
in the li~tht of its relis:t1onsbip to,~1rd .~ll other existing 
intern.ational conventions.lo 
Despite the a1,:parent cleverness o.f the Kellogg note 
the 1Vashington authorities do not seem to ho.Ve tull,y appre-
eiated that a multilateral treaty was a great deal more 
ti.on by one member of sueh a 'treaty as th.rit :pr{iJH:>sed v10uld 
involve. all ,tgnat,ories, v1he.reas a number of bil~teral 
treaties of wb.i.eh the UnJ.ted States was a pa:rt1 would be ot 
no co-noern to cu1.y ex(M~J1t the two signatories. :took1.ng at 
the rnatter JH'.>l.itic~1ll,y 1 a bila.tera.1 treaty 'between France 
and. t.he United States would not bring into question, eJtcept 
in tJ1eory 1 the tre8.ty obligationi1 of France 1111th the rest 
ot Jfilurope; bu.t such a trel!l.tY in mu.ltilateral forn1 among the 
six Great Powers involved a consideration Qi' the Whole series 
of ¥10rld-.wide obligations including the Ireague and Looarno 
Treaties. 11 
States, Mr. Olaude1, st,ate-d tha:t the French Government v1as 
governments of Fra11oe and the 'Oni ted States f1rst sif)l: sueb. 
an agreen1ent, and then invite the other powers to a<ther$. He 
10 l~iller, The Peaee J?act or Paris, p. 17 .. 
~ '' ~. ..-......,,._ 
ll. Ibid., P~ 19. 
sionn in.stead of the term t1war as an instrumen.t ot national 
:policy• ftl.2 
:Mr .. Kallogg•s note of J'anuw.ry ll dealt with the newly 
suggested procedure and eon.tent in a straightforward fashion .. 
He suggested that Fran.ee Join with the United states in 
communieI1tir1g with th.e British, German, J:apanese, 1.:1nd Italian 
governments the text of' Brland 1 s original proposal and the 
copies or the subsequent <H>rre.spondenee between fi'ran.oa and 
the United States on the u:nd.ersta.nd ing that this preliminaey 
discussion in no ·iway eo.m.mi tted any of the parti.c ipating 
governments pending the concl:ualon ot a fi.nal treaty. The 
Fre:neh suggestion t:tu1.t all governments be in,,.ited to adhere 
to a. ready-made treaty was open to the obj~ctlon that some 
:!Powers might, delay 01~ refu.se acee:pta:nce and so ·u1e treaty 
would not oom.e in.to force at ~11 and the att'orts would. be 
rendered of no avail. practical solution would be to be-
~Jin negotiations .for a m.ultils.teral treaty 'by submitting tl1e 
!:riancl pro.po!:!al or Jur1e 20, 1~27, as a basis for discussion 
15 and a,g_reemant.. · 
Tile Frenc.h Governr11ant, in their note of January 21, 
seem to criticize tlle attitude ot the United States in their 
unwillingness to ernbody tlle I'rencl1 declaration in more than 
--------------------------------
12 ''Tl':ie Franch J'.._111bassador to the JUnerieta.n Seeretary of 
State, 1t '.Publication !{o. 488·, :p ... 14 .. 
13 1rThe Atr1erican ;ieeretary of State 'to the French 
Jlmba.Sf:W.dor"" 1)-ublieatlon Mo .. 468, pp. 15·1'1. 
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the preamble of the Franao-fUneriean arbitration treaty 
vmieh v;as in the process of development at this time. The 
note also suggests that while th.01 see :no objections to be-
ginning a multilateral treaty by France and the United 
States first signing, they are willing to listen to sugges-
tions that might see1:1 more praetioal to the United States. 
Briand al$O culls attention to complications which vrould 
be necessitated ,men other :powers wh1eh are .members ot the 
League ot !iation:a and Lcuiarno Treat,ies are oonsidered.14 
The first ansvfer from 1TJash1ngton to 'Eriand 1 s note of 
January 21 ea.me from. Senator Borah, Ohe..irman of the Sen.at,e 
Foreign R~lations Committee, in an arti-ele to the 1-;rew York 
Tim.as, d&ted Sunday, February 5. He answered point by 
point the French note and sh.ov:ed clearly that a treaty to 
renounce VJar as an instrument of national policy woulcl 
strengthen not only the Oovemint of tho l,ea.gue of Mat!ons 
and also the tocarno Treaties but any other legitimate 
treaty of neutrality. If France could. sign a treaty with 
the United States to that effect ·w1 thout violating the 
principles of the Covenant of' the League. th.en any other 
member could do the samee Then if' ttll members of the 
covenant and Locarno Treaties, renounced w.S'tJ." alon,~ ,11th the 
United States the machinery for maintaining peaoe would 
surely be st-rengthened ... 
Senator Boran•s argument was irrefutable; ho 
14 ffTha French .i.:unb-assadol" to the .i\m.e.rioa.n Seereta.ry ot 
s;ta'te, ff Publication no. 468, pp. 19-21. 
21 
went behind the facade of the structure of the 
League or Nations to emph.asize its purpose and its 
tundam~tal prineiple, which is the .maintenanoe ot 
peace. 
He furthermore pointed out that the Kellogg proposal 
as a solemn pledge to id the ·orkings of other pea.ea 
machinery - arbitration tr6at1es, conciliation treaties, 
the Hague Tribunal, the orld Court, the peace machinery of 
the League, and the machinery of Loearno.16 
There can be no doubt but thn.t Senator Borah's argu-
ment influenced the subsequent negotiation with ranee, tor 
1n the Kellogg letter of ebru r y 2'1 he not only repeated 
the argument that ppeared in the rie York Timesl7 but also 
stated that if France could become party to a bilateral 
treaty with the United States renounoing war as an instru-
ment of n tional policy, th n she could sign one with the 
other powers, as the difference bet een a bilateral treaty 
and a ..multilateral tre ty renouncing war s an instrument 
or national poLicy 1 s one of "''degree and not of substance. ,,18 
As a further argument to show that the complete abolition of 
the institution of war ms not incompatible with the theory 
of t he Le gue of Nations. he pointed out that the Sixth 
International Conference or erican States had passed a 
15 Shotwell,_!!.!! __a Instrument .2.! National Policy, 
p. 136. 
16 lli.g_ .. , p. 137. 
17 .,The erican Secretary of State to the French 
bassador,' Publication o. 468, p. 22. 
18 ~-, p. 22. 
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resolut.ion in which the twenty-one American States repre-
sented had condemned war as an instrument of national policy 
in their mutu.al relations. Seventeen or these twenty-one 
states are members oft e League of . ~tions.1g ellogg 
also maintained h1s former position reg rding the use of 
the phrase "wars of aggression .. " He :felt that the use of 
this term with any acoompanying definition or explanation 
could not but weaken its value as a means of guaranteeing 
peace.20 The suggestion contained in the note of January 11 
is also repeated 
th t the Go ernment of France join with the 
Government of the United States in transmitting to 
the .British, It 11an, German and J"apanese Oove-rn-
ents tor their oonsiderat1on and comment the text 
of~. Br1and's original :proposal, together with 
copies of the subsequent correspondence between 
France and the United States as a basis for pre-
liminary discussions looking to the conclusion of 
an appropriate_~ultilateral treaty proscribing re-
course to war.u 
It might be ~ell to pause here for an analysis of the 
divergent views regarding the proposed multilateral tre ty. 
The French did not insist on their suggested procedure, a 
treaty between the two countries to whioh other n tions were 
invited to adhere, although this was without doubt closely 
connected 1th the question at issue. If this view were 
followed, the treaty could be adopted alreost regardless or 
then ber of signatories or the method of obt ining hem. 
19 Ibid •• p. 23. -
ZO Ibid., p. 23. -
21 Ibid., p. 24. -
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On the other hand the erioan formula, if acceptable at all, 
would require a much more general e.coeptanoe bef'ore it should 
come into 1'orce. 
France insisted on renuneiation of war of "aggression," 
An!erioa was tor ren.unoiation of ar s n instrument of 
national policy. ~aoh a reed on the settlement of disputes 
by pacific means only. question worthy of e:xa iaation is 
hether in reality there is any dift'erenoe in thought or 
eaning between the fonnulas of the two countries. Both 
seemed to agree that "w rot aggression~ is more limited in 
a sense than ,r ar as an instrument or n tion 1 policy. n 
dm1tting the diffioulty or classifying a oase that might 
come ithin the scope of either, and admitting the d1fti-
oulty o:r finding words to define either, the question may 
be looked at from the point of view ot language and theory. 22 
Certainly self-defense was outside of the French pro-
l)Osal, for self-defense would be the opposite of aggression. 
It was outside of the meaning of the Kellogg proposal, tor 
accord.ing to • Kellogg's statement at the .American Soe1ety 
of International Le on April 28, 1928, he stated that the 
anti- ar treaty in no way impaired the right or a nation to 
defend its territory trom atta.ok or invasion. 23 It would 
seem too, that _u-. Kellogg had on arch l assured the French 
22 Miller, !h! Peace Pact £!, Paris, p. 38 •. 
23 Frank B. Kel.logg, Speech delivered betore the 
er1can Sooiety or International Law, ·pril 28, 1928, !!! 
York Times, . April 29, 1028. 
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iw1bassador that the renunciation of ~,,ar as .Proclaimed in 
the trtHtty 1.1.rould not deprive the signatories o.f the legiti-
mate right of self'-.de:tenae. 24 
In the French note of March 30, 1928, Briand. made the 
following statement: 
The French Government is willing to adopt as 
:pra0tical a poin.t as possible and to facilitate as 
far as it cm,n the efforts of the American Govern-
ment in the direetion of an immediate deoision .... 25 
He does: not believe, however, that a multilateral 
treaty could be included. in the .same form as a bilateral 
treaty .. Four essential points were mentioned whleh it will 
be necessary to classify. ( l) The right of self ... defense 
was not to be prohibited. by the proposed treaty.. (2) If 
any nation violated the treaty, obligatiQns toward tiw. t 
nation should end.. (3} ·rhe treaty s.hould be universally a.o-
eepted. by the nations before it shou.ld come into foree,. 
(4) The obligations of the new treaty' should not in any v1ay 
impair the .obligations of :previous treaties, partloularly 
those of the CoveD,ant, .of l-00:arno, and of the Meutrality 
.,~ 
Treatles.""'0 
France agreed. to a submission of the .June 20 proposal 
together with .subsequent eorrespondenoe of the United States 
and, Fran-ee to four previously mentioned powers tor their 
24 Miller, 'fhe Peace l?e.ot of Par1s. 'n. 43 .. ............. . ' -_- -~....,. .,. J:t' 
25 ~The ltrenoJ:1 11\mbassa.d.0·1" to the American Secretary of 
Bta.te, n Publ.ieation !Jo. 468, p .. 28. 
26 Ibi.d'", p. 51 .. 
iiscussion. and agreement .. 2'1 
Thia letter marks t.be closing ot the first phase of the 
n..egotiations. Some thought that it was the end o:f' the pro-
posal .itself,. Liberals in both France .am J\merioe. regis-
t.ered strong oppo:sition to the negative tone ot the French 
note·,. whil.e the reactionary press in Paris claimed that 
those who had originated the plan hoped th.at they had seen 
the ·1ast of the Kellogg proposa.1.28 
As a result. of the .French. note ot :Ma.reb 50 there was 
one important change .in the subsequent negotiations.. In-
stead of a Joint proposal to the other four powers as the 
1unerican. Seeretary ot State had suggested, there now eame a 
p.roposal t·rom the United States made April 13 and u counter · 
French proposal. dated April. 20. 29 
It appears that there ,vas eonversat1on between M.areh 50 
and April 13, :for the Kellogg note or the latter date. sent 
in tb.,e identical torm to the Government of Great Britain, 
Germany, Italy, and Japan, states that the governments were 
in "'com.plete agreement" as to the. procedure. ,Ytde note 
mates a elea.r statement regarding th.a views of the A..meriean 
and F:rench Governments and en.closes copies of the oorrespon4-
enoe which had taken place between France and the United 
States f:.t"om J'une 20, 1927, to Mareh 30, lil2B.. A preliminary 
a7 Ibid., p. 30. -
25 Shotwell, .!'1~ .!! ~· lnstr~ni of Nati()llal P0:l~oz. 
p .. 141. 
29 n1· ·11 . rm,.. n p ,i.. . 'lit p 1 . . i:::·A ~ •.. er, .~ .. eaoe a<h, 2.::, ar s, p .. ~ .. 
26 
<iratt. of c.. treaty representing 1» 111. general way the form ot 
a treG,ty tl'fhieh the United States was p:repal"ed to sign. with 
the Government of France, Great Britain, Gem.any, Italy, 
and .Ts.pan. The wording of artieles one and t·tNO of this 
treaty was almost the same as that or the or·iginal Briand 
offar.30 
A oo_py or the American draft and at the note had been 
sent to Paris on April 11.51 
The t1ro primary artioles of the .American proposal are 
as fo,llows: 
Article I 
l'he High Oontraoting :Parties solemnly declare 
in the names ot their respective peopl.es that they 
condemn recourse to war for the solution of int.er ... 
national controversies and renounce it as an instru• 
.ment of national policy in their relation$ wit.Ja· one 
another. 
lu-tiole II 
The High Contracting 1)art1es agree that the 
se·ttlement or solution of all. disputes or eonfliots 
of whatever nature· or of whatever origin, tbey mar 
be, which may arise among them, shall. never be 
sought exeept. by pacific mean~ .. 
A comparison of' this with th.a wordin.g of the Briand 
t.teaty of Juue 20, 1927., reveala ·few changes.. In the first 
article the words ,,.o:t the French people and the people of 
the United St~tes of .fozerica" a.re changed to 11-of their 
respective p<toples. ". 'i'hl.s obviously is necessary to a. multi-
50 ff!den.tieal Notes from the Gov•rnment of the United 
States to tbe Ooverm1ents of Great :Sri tnin, Germany, Italy, 
and J"apan, on Apt"il 13, l928,1t Publication Jth 468, pp .. 32-34 .. 
31 Millert ;r:g~ Peac.a Pact. !?!. Paris, P-~ 52. 
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lateral instead of a bilateral treat1 as was planned orig1-
n.all:r by M. Briand.. In the original lGAnguage v1as a solemn 
declaration ttthat they· condemn reeo-urse to war.~· The 
.American dre.ft reads ttthey condemn l'"eeourae to war for the 
settlemen.t of internatiorie.l controversies. fl Just why this 
phrase is add.ed is not imm.t ioned in any or the later oorre-
s-pondenee. 
l..rti ole two follovrad very closely the v..-orUng ot the 
Freneb. Draft Pa.ct ot Perpetual 1"riendship. At tbe · beginning, 
however, the words, .. The High Oo:ntraeting P.arties agree 
that, r, ·w9re inserted., Probably this does not make any real 
change in the meaning. 
On April 20, the Itrench Govern.ment sent a note to the 
Government o:f Oreat t;ri tain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the 
'United States.. In this letter hope vias expressed that all 
n.ations t-lotild j<>in in the humane program rJf :renunciation of 
. . '!' f) 
war t1s c.n instrument of national peliey.vr., With the note 
was included the French Draft tor a multilateral treaty 
:renouncing. war tis an instrument of national polioy .. 33 
~e French of:rer contained six s.rtieles where the 
luner1ca...-.. had contained only t..hree. The oh.ie:f ditterences 
between the two dratts were that the l!'re-nch de.tined v.rar as 
an instrum.ent ot national policy; explained the legitimaoy-
5.Z t1I)rat't ot Proposed Treaty Submitted by the Govern• 
m.ent ot' France to the Governments of Great Brita.in, Germany, 
Italy_ Japan and tho Uni ta4 states on April 20, 1928, i, 
Publieatio-n No. 466, p .. 37. 
or self-defense:;. brought out that it one s1gna.tory violated 
the provisions, the· oth&rs \Vere released trom their oblf.ga-
tions under the treaty; and includ.ed the prov1sio-n thatthis 
t~eat,- in no tvay atfeoted the rights ~nd obligatioa.s existing 
under previous international s:greements .. 34 
29 
The .t'\merican and French vievrs ware n.ow before the British, 
C'l'Srm.a.n, Italian, and J'apane·se C-10vernments.. ~e eo:;,m.ent:$ ot 
thes.e tour poi'lrers togethe.r with th.a .speech of Secretary of 
State Kellogg bef'->re the ~i;mericM Soe1et7 of International 
Law at Wash.ington on April 25, 1928~ form the .n-ext step in 
the exchanges. 
Th~ first of the nations to r,ply was Germany under 
data ot April 27, 1928. Thia was the day previous to the 
Kellogg speech oef ore the .t:.merican Society of International 
Law, so it oould not have been influenced by those explana-
tions.. On the other hand, G-er,many was on the most cordial 
terms with the United States, and al.most any proposal coming 
from tne lUner1ean C",r0ver.n.inent was bound to have governm.ental 
and popular supJ)ort ~ At the s~ time the r~lations ~etween 
Germany c>n the one hand and those ot Great Britain and France 
on the other t,mre Quite triendly, .and Germany had. every 
reason to wish them to become more so.35 
tphe German note first referred to the negctia.tlo.ns 'be.;.. 
tween the Governments of the tTnited Stat.es and Fra~oe and to 
54 Ibi. ·A n ~" ~ ; .i?·a ¥.,..1,= ;p 
35 K!.ller, '1'he Peace Pa.ct. ,g! Paris, p .. 61. 
the 1n'·o11osal made in the note of .April 13; it sta.ted that 
cona:lderat.ion had been given to the Freneh Draft ot 
i\'Pril 20. 3e 
The German Government expressed eordial approval or 
tts.n intern~t:tonJ£il pact, !'or thli cn1tltr1iry of wr~:u.~n and stated: 
the t1no main :idess on w.hi.ch are based ·t.n.e ini ti.ati ve 
of tbe 11':reneh Mln.ister of Foreign ,Affa1r,s and tl1e 
resu1 ting proposal of the United. States correspond. 
fully t;J) the principles of 1Jer.:r,1,an policy. 37 
ra~pect tor the oblL;;.i:aticns i,ri.si.rt{S; from. the Coven"~nt 
of the League of 1:ffations and the Rhine ?a.et must, in 
t'11,e oph'liOn crf the GerE1:an ~J.overnment, reme.in invtola.ta. 
an inatrutiien1t o.f natiowal policy should only S1:;Htve to 
s~re~gte~n ~h! Cov!mant or the League of Li:et1o:ns and 
oi tno .Rhine l"act. 
case of' a violatio:n. 1t It ali30 agreed that the 1tv,l t:1 . .rra,t,e 
· goal must 1,is the Ulliirersal:lty of the net\l pao·t. r• f,9 
______ ..........,.... ___ '"' _ , ___ ~·----------------------
38 Ibid., p. 41., 
~ 
39 .±.!?.l~· ' p .. 41 .. 
30 
next in order. It gave. assurance that Italy :tnvored the 
policy an.cl was ,vi llinr3 to aid in reaching an agreement. 
powers Vlh.vse di.reot interest in the propo1.3ed trec:i.'ty :tu-1d 
been EHllisi;ed .. n 40 ,i:rn,arentl:ir this meeting :never materialized 
c.1ue t,c, the opinion of Secrot,ary Kellogg and. others that 1 t 
iu Washi11gton, A:p.ril 28. Briefly sumtuarized, the inter-
p::t:etations fo,llo1r:1.. (1) Self-dtifenae 'Nao to be taken tor 
no afti;r-:m.ative pri.mary obligatlons ·to go to war. It wight 
,Nhethe.r the .authorization v.'hs legi tiwate and necessary. 
(3) Sirnilarly., tlie Treat,ies o:t tocarno rnight cRll for :poli<=e 
action but only against a l:lation which had resort,eii to war 
----~·------------------~----..,_ ___ """""""' __ _ 
40 uT:n.e ltalian·:Miniater ot Foreign A.ffa.ira to the 
~, • . ' b ... . l"" "'!1-<i. ~·-1 · t /Ir f"A ' ~ .,,._ ~·•1 A -0 "? h\.m.ei0 1.cru1 c:'llt1·,assano1·, • .1::uu 1e&bl.on ,;Jo~. ~·;;,o, p. -:;:uJ. .. 
41 Mille•r, '2lle reace :Fact of l?ar:ts, p,. 6G. 
~---- ~ ............ 
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in violation to its solemn pledge thereunder. (4) Treaties 
of' neutrality, to hieh France had referred, were presumably 
of the same defensive nature, and if l of the signatories 
were equally to join this anti-war tre ty, it ould simply 
dd to the guarantee of peace. (5) This strengthening or 
the existing guarantees of :peace •as inherent 1n the multi-
1 teral tre ty because it ·ould go without saying that any 
viol tion of it would automa.tically release tha other par-
ties from their obligations to the treaty breaking state. 
(6) Wile hoping that the treaty 'Oul be coepted universal-
ly, it should b cm effective when approved by the six 
Gre t Pow r • namely, Great Britain, -'ranee, Ger: ny, Italy, 
~rapan, Md the United States .42 
Si r ... ustin Chamberlain's Mote of •ay 19 is o:o.e of the 
moat signifie nt of the diplomatic exc.h nge :preceding the 
makin of the treaty. It describe clva.rly d at lex gth 
the rioan an . r no proposals and l ft no dou t s to 
the Briti h po~1t1on on all oints.43 
First of t.\ll, he t akes up the t710 raft treaties and 
att I!lpts to har1;.1.onize them by stressing thei common pur-
poseu and pointing out that the reneh are m rely trying to 
state more precisely the condition., under which the treaty 
would be applied. There is no concealing the prci'e enee ot 
42 Fre.nk B. Kellogg, .French Draft of ~ .,ultllateral 
Treat? for the Renunciation 2.!. 1!!:. (. ashington: Government 
Pr!nt n~ffice, 1§28), pp. 1-3 .• 
43 iller, !a! Peace Pact 2! Paris, p. 67. 
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the Br.itish Foreign. 0.ffiee .tor a greater preois.ion than is 
to be found in the Am&ri.ean text, but it finds a way of 
harmoniz.ing the two by putting Mr. Kellogg•s explanation o.f 
may have, eqmil value ·with the terms of the treaty itself. 
each nation to apply the treaty aoocrdi11g to i'tn o...-..'ll condi-
t . 44 ion.a. · 
There is one part of the British note v1hieh deserves to 
be quoted in i'ull beeause o.f its special beax' in,g on the in-
terpreta,.t ion of self•deten.se .. 
There are certain regions or the •;vorld the wel-
fe.re and integrity ot which constitute o. sr,ecit,l and 
vital interest tor ou.r ;:eaoe and $afety. His 1v:aj·es:-
ty's Government have been. at pains to make it olear 
in the past that interference · v:ri th those regions can-
not be suffered. Their protection against attack is 
tr:> the British Enroira a measure ot .self-fJ.sf·on$.e.. It 
must be clearly understood that His ]Xajesty' s Q:overn-
ment in Great Britain accept t,he n~w" treaty upon the 
distinct understand.ing that it does not prejudice their 
freedom of actic11 in tr.J.s, respect.. The Governmertt ot 
the United. 3tat,es have comparable interests any dis-
regard of which by a foreign Povve1 .. they have deol.ared 
that they would regard a.s an unfriendly act. His 
Majesty's Government believe, t1:te.t>e:tore,· that in 
defining their pos1 tion they are e:x.pre.ssing the in-
tention and meaning of the United states G.over1une11t. 45 
IJ.fllese tj,un.speci:f'ied 1•egi.oas" must oertai:uly have been 
Egypt and tho .:Persian (Julf.. Here they· consid.ered th.fat their 
peat tion v:as similar to that ot the United ~3:ta:t,&ft 0 :i;~i it~ 
,
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44 "The British 8eoret~ry of St~~,:1 for: Eoi.eieJ:;~ ot':t'.'t~i':r-~~-" 
to the American Ambassad.or~ l!ay 19; 19~,,r, 0 P11t;liea\ion ,No,, 0 
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W-este.rn HelltJ.sphere. To this :paragraph Kellogg never re-
ferred. The British ha.d al.lu.ded to the rionroe Doctrine, 
although not by name, and an.1 turther discussion m.ight have 
led to some observations in the correspondence about the 
t1onroe Doctrine 1 tself.. Certainly aueh ~11s not the wish o.f 
th$ American Department ot State .. 46 
Finally the note agreed that it was not neeessary to 
wait unt.11 all nations had sisned be:f'ore the treaty went 
into efteet but suggested that "certain other States in 
:Europen might be included. It also called attention to the 
necessity ot participation of the Goverrunents·ot the Domin-
ions and that of India,.47 These latter mentioned were noti-
:fied by tb.e English Government and almost immediately sent 
notes expressing their willingne.ss to renounce war as an 
instrument. or national poliey. 
1apu, the la.st ot the Great Pow&rs to answer the 
Kel.logg let.te:r ot April 13 was quite briel' in her reply. 
lier answer was one ot complete agreement with the position 
taken by the United States. Tanaka spoke of the "high and 
beneficent aims or the proposal» and said that 1 t was taken 
nto i:mplJ the entire abolition or the institution of war." 
Re al.so e;cpressed conviction that unanimous adherence of 
the six Great Pov,era referred to eould be real1ze,d and that 
they would be happy to aid in furthering a move for estab• 
46' tiller, ~ Peace Pact or ,Paris • p. fl9. 
4'1 Publication No. 468,. p .. 46. 
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l.ishing an t1era f.>f per:manent and univers!ll :peac.e. 1148 
' i 
;t;,,,,,. Beto.re geing in.to the tin~ stages or tbe nes·otiation 
it ,might be well to oonsid.ar opinions of the proposal$ out-
aide ot· diplomatic ¢ircles.. Statesmea in Europe were dis• 
ooverug that tlleir e:rtorts tor security were made tutile 
bf the a'bse:o.ee of the United iS'tates from. the Loague of 
ir,:-:r..,.t .. 1' ·""ll' · .m. Jt:.-1...:.~ . !WP ...... 
1d th 'France alone would ea.use ua 'to seem to be allied i11tb. 
her. snd it we extended it to other countries v,*e would f'ind 
ourselves i:n a kind of' European !tonroe noctrine with the 
United 8t.ates agreeins never to intervene in a. ~ur,o:1;r.ea.n. oon-
fliot. Othe~s oonsidore4 tbe peace :move as an attempt on 
tho part .ot gov.;umments to b$tone eo-e.:xtensi ve w1 th the 
world-wide economl¢ systenI.4$ 
Europe tel t th~t t'he proposed an.ti.-war treaty would 
bring the Uni te4 Str.ates into closer relationship wl t.h the 
Ls~au,e ot !iationa, 11iMle 1n .America it , .. ·as believed that 
adJ:ierene·a to a: t~eat;r ren.ounelng war ~a an instrument or 
nat.iona.J. polio:, V!!OUlt have a tremendous i~ral influence in 
p~oting world peac.e. 50 At. tbe sa,roe tin>Ji'> i·t was e.onoeded 
that siuoe war§3 ririse tr.om <nauses that a.re o.caidental and 
48 "The la,panese flin.ister ~or Foreign .Affairs to tlke 
Jc.~i@r:1erll1 A.nibassador., !lay 25, 1928,t., Publication .No. 468, 
p. 51.. . 
49 ,.Hidden Jokes 1n the No-War Paet., •l ~1 t~.i:~z P.J.&e~~. 
XCVI (J'anruiry 7, 1928},. 10. 
-50 1. T •. Gero'1ld, +~Amari-can Proposals fo:r JUl-Arou:nd 
tTeaties to Outla1.~ War, *t Current. Ui.!t<?rL, llVI.Il (Turay, 
1918), 282. . 
conflict.. So long B..$ tht1 dual tuas good :f'orm, it persisted; 
it gr,S.dually ceased v1hen rulerl out of good socia'ty .. 
been relegated to the :past.. In the same way, why vras it 
not reasonable to believe that 1t'lar bett'leen nati,on.s could 
be placed. in the sa1wJ category with other vwrn-out relies 
0 411 .. n-g-t. ,,,,,._,,,..,.,"":151 J.. J;·Ci;. ?.ii MQ_~...,. 4 
f,i~tlons, but the United Stat~s hr.id declined to t'..a'!te a ;part. 
In the Qenoct oon:fe:reuce of 1922:, Llo;rd George induced the 
:main.ad aloof. ']:ha Locarno Fact in U,25 ,atte,mpted to bind 
·the leading :European nations to give up theix- right to make 
war. The principle applied in these agreements is to 
fliot broke out. rrne Kellogg proposal st,9.tes simply that 
5~ ... ·· a.moat too sirnJ,?le to be practical. = ,} 
'.feellogg's proposali although not taken .s~riously in 
most parts of Europe, would be approved as soon as enough 
reservations eould be F,z:1.d,e to .leave o<.)ndi tions. ex:aot1y as 
t.hey v1ere before the pa.et was .signed. European nations 
--------------------------------
51 ~., p,. 284. 
52 George Glasgow, "American 11roposals for Pa.et or 
l?aeifis1n, n Contemporary Review. CXXXIII {May, 1926), 545. 
would not be bound to an American program; the Unlted States 
would bs t,ied to Europe. 'fb1s would tollovr, because once 
i,e joined, we would h.ava moral obligations when any ot,b.er 
signatory violated the pact. The Kellogg Treaty could not 
lilOdit':., nor abolish any of the machinery whioh had been pre-
pared for protection against calamities which were a.lwa1s 
possible and at times seemed inevitable. Europe cannot think 
ot peaee without police force to :maintain it. She is not 
acting in bad faith by taking the stand :mentioned. l!er ex-
perience has been d.if:ferent to ours, and &be would no more 
ohe.nge than an Eskimo would disoard his furs beeaus-e told b1 
em_ inhabitant of the tropics that they were unsanitary .. 
What people of Eu.rope really think or· the proposal never 
gets into oftieial documents and seldom to the press. They 
oannot 'bu utter words of praise because they oannot afford 
to offend the United Stat.es.i5 
The Department of: State n.ow had before 1 t, vd. th the 
'Franch counter proposal, the oomment of ten other goYern-
ments on t~ ti.vo drafts. .Some of them advanced the discus-
sion little., it at all,. Italy, J\ustralia, and ?1ew Zealand 
had been al.r:m:>st $!lent on the ditferences in the two pro-
posals, and India bad ~*rely made reference to- the British 
note of ?Jay 19. 'The other six governments, however, had 
st.s.ted their respective positions more or leiia at length. 
53 F,. H. Simonds, "Kellogg l?roposals,1t Review ot 
Rev1ev1s, LXXVII.I (Ju.ly, 1928}, 78-'19 .. 
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and the$e, taken in eonneotion with the Freneh attitude put 
bet ore l1r. Kellogg two problems for the tollowirag negotia-
tions. 
The tirst of these problems which pertained to the 
number· or original signatories had practically been solved. 
Briana's original proposal had called for a bilateral agree .... 
sx~ded by Mr. Kellogg to include tha six Great Powers 
11-d. th provisicms snd hopes the..t all nat,ions adhere. Ji.fter 
some vacillation France had suggested that this multilateral 
tl~®a.ty not isome into eftect until it had been accepted 
unlV$rs~ll;r, or almost so. tier :Pr.\l."'tioula:r desire v1as to 
get ru.1 :parties of: tlle Locarno 1l?re.aties to faip this new 
treaty in the first inetanoe. In his speech of 1:.pril 28:, 
Mr. Kellogg ho.d e1.1n:essed ·will.ingness to admit Belgium, 
Poland, and Cz.eohoslovak:ia, the other Locarno f'Owe;i::-s, and 
had brought in the t1 ve Briti.s4 Dominions and the Gcvex11ment 
of India.. As no other country had joined Franae in insisting 
. on the. universality of t.be treaty 1. she seemed. t.o be eatis-
ti.ed when the other Looarno l?o'w-ers were inoluded.. l!oreover,. 
it should be said that al.though not explicitly itdieated by 
the terms. or the t.reat.y itself, the p1'0eedure toUowed 
caused oomplete realization o:r the :rr1 .. eneh de.s1.re. 54 
'?he s·eco-nd question was whe·ther, and if so, to ,'Jhat 
5-4. Miller. The Peace Paqt of Paris, p. 81. 
~ , .. """"""· .............- .. 
origine.l signatories .. Thus, if all of the ;Parties of the 
agree:ment that thei1" obligati.ons ranm.1n intact, there was 
t;o !llak3 .mention of it in tr.re treaty. The situation 
regitrd.ing tne relationship toward. the League of Ha·tions was 
similar, altbough probably not quite so elear.55 
On J'une 23, the United States Government submitted a 
revised treaty to fourteen governments, in.eluding the 
the construction placed by the United States upon the 
var.ious points raised, and by quoting from the speech made 
by the Seeretal"'Y of State, on April 28, before the P._1'!1erican 
Society of lnterna;tiona.1 Luw .. 56 
Ai.1 intere:sting omission fro:rn the note was in regard to 
the so-called British ''h.:!onroen or Reglonal Doctrine, 
announced in the British note ot: May 19. Jts to this, !JU~. 
Kellogg probably- had good reason tor not alluding. tl:hile 
th.e silence ne:re of' the /:uI1.eriee.n note meant consent to the 
!British declaration, still the silence was interesting.5? 
In the li-'reamble of the I'ifew Draft frreaty Mr. Kellogg 
gave recognition to the prinai;ple that nany signatory ?ower 
--------------:If~---·----·---· _,,.. ___ .,..,._:111-•1191 .... , ____ ~-----
55 .Ibid., p. 62~ 
56 "The Government of the United States to this Govern-
ments of Belgiuni, Gz.echoslovakia, 1:".'ranoe, (lerma.ny. Great 
B:ritttiri.t Irish. Free StHte, Italy, Japan, and Polandt J"une 23, 
1928," Publication Mo. 468, pp. 57-58. 
57 Miller, The :Peace Paet or :Paris, p. 84. 
\1lhioh shall herea.rter seek to promote its national interest 
by resort to vtTa.r shall be deni·ed the benefits furnished. b:y 
this treaty •. v, · 
The body of the new treaty is id:entioal with that o.f 
April lS. The phrase previously cruoted \~s the one in Which 
Mr. Kellogg :mad.e his greatest concession regarding the 
e.fteot of a. vi~lation. of t.he treaty. 58 
lflith thie, lir •. Kellogg e.nnouneed that the United States 
was ready to s_ig:n at once a !ttreaty in t.he form therein pro- . 
posed," and ·expressed the hope that eaeh of the tourueen 
Governments to who:m the note was addressed VJOuld "be able 
promptly to indicate its readiness to aoeept, ,nth:out qu.ali-
tioations or reservations .t tb.e form ot treat.1 no,rr suggested 
by the United States. i1 111r. Kellogg added his belief t.h.at 1:t 
the fifteen Powers could agree on this form he was oontident 
that the other nations of the world would soon adhere, and 
concluded his note \~1th a request, to be informed at oo 
early.date whether the Governments addressed would join in 
the Treaty nin the torm transmitted .. tt59 
The Department et Sta.ta recei'ved answers trom all the 
taurteen governments to whom the note of June 23 was addressed 
between J"uly ll and Sul:r 20 .. Allot these notes expressed 
willingness on the part of their !OVernments to become 
original signatories of the treaty "'in th$ :form transmitted~ 
40 
by the American Secretary ot State. 60 
By a happy inspiration tb.e Department of State sugges-
ted that, the treaty be signed at Paris. The cho1,oe or Paris 
,s the place for signing the Pact was a tribute to the im-
portant pa.rt played by • Briand, the French Foreign Minis-
ter, in the initiating and :furthering or the negotiations 
which culminated 1n the actual affixing of the signatures 
ot the designated plenipot~ntiaries. 61 Due honor shoul4 
also be given to Mr. Kellogg, since he had so faithfully 
pursued h1s a im of a world-wide mul.tilateral treaty tor the 
renunciation ot war in. simpl.e text; and he had reached his 
goal .. 62 
&O Shotwell, ~ .!!!. .!!! Instrument £.t National Policz, 
p. 1'13. 
61 Ibid.• p . 174. -
62 Miller, !a,! Peaoe !!2! .2,! Par!$, p. 112. 
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The ~.:earii.n::: of the :Paet 
~"- ,t. ~ ........ ,.............,..~ 
IJ/aS to bear her name.. Flags from all eou.nt:ries were dis-
WitlJ.i:n the Q:uai d' Orsay 1 tself there was e. touch of eere-
rnony laakir.i.g when the delegates ·wfmt to their places. The 
plenipotentiaries were gui.ded to their places at the great 
hors.eshoe table by gal ly unitormed ushers and a uniformed 
sv,iss Qua.rd led the procession i'ro.m the .reception room to 
the cloek room, where the signing took: plaee.l 
l'he ,ceremony of signature took pla.ce at three o'clock 
in the afternoon. It eonsi.sted or an address or weleom.e to 
the plenipotentiaries by the French Minister of Foreign 
.At fairs, 1:i.ristide Brir::U1d, and the reading of the French and 
ICnglish. texts of tb.e treaty, followed by the signing by the'. 
:t"itteen original signatories. 2 
iU'ter the signing of the Bri,and..:Kellogg Pact on August 
27, 1928, by the fifteen orig.ina.l sl~atories, the Uni.ted 
States immediately delivered 1.nvitations to adhere to all. 
of' the independent nationz;. except Russia. 3 Tr1e invitation 
to the Russian Government; was delivered by the Fran.oh 
l .Sbo'tv1&ll, <J·far as an Instrument ~! National Pollet, 
p. 180. - - -
2 Publication l~o. 468, p. 5 ... 
5 rJiiller, The fieace Faot of .Faris, p. 2£0 .. 
Ambassador., as the United States di.d not recognize the Union 
of the Soviet socialist B.epublies .. 4 
:Between August 27, 1928, and tul1 24, 1929, the date 
that the Paet became etteoti ve, many ~u.estiona arose 1.,e-
garding its interpretation. Was it only an act of good 
faith, a moral gesture, or did it mean that 'Wal? as an 
instrum.ent of national polioy was notu:a.lly surrendered? If 
it \\"ere really to be put into actual praetica, how was 1t 
to be vvorked out and applied, and \Vhat obllgations did the 
United States ass.um.&? Another series of vi ta1 questions 
pertain~d to the reservations by the separate signatories .. 
11.fhat etfect did they have? Bad they robbed the treaty ot 
its purpose, or mere.ly stated ,rJondi tions under wh ieh it 
would have to be worked out? 
Opinion as to the worth of the Paet varied greatly 
43 
among s1.Jholars and. statesmen.. It.s suppox-ters deolared that 
war was renounced forever a.m that no nation would dare 
affront the moral sentiments o,f the world by breakillg its 
pledge. Some ,observers, pointed out that with the universality 
of peaee assured, national security wai.s at last realized; 
armaments could be reduoed and. a.11 energies directed to the 
building ot a cooperative international order. Critles ot 
the Pact wre as hoe.tile in denouncing it as its friends 
were warm in 1.ts praise. International lawyers argued that 
the numerous interpretatlons brought into the docwnent in the 
4i Ibi,d •. , p. 5. -
eourse of its development reduced it to a mere temperance 
pledge with no binding force and a questionable moral 
value. 5 · · 
In his speech on the occasion or the signing ot the 
Paot M. Briand points out that since war has been stripped 
of its legality nations ill gradually bandon the habit 
ot associating the idea. of national prestige with national 
torce. 6 He continues by observing that the leaders ot 
nations s.igna.tory to the Pact would not run the risk or 
ineurrin the reprobation of their associates by provoking 
a war. 
.., 
The Kellogg Pact is a very important instrument. For 
the first time in history it established the principle of 
outlawry of all aggressiYe ar in an international conven-
tion. The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pacts 
of Loearno proscribe certain ty.pes of war among those who 
are members. In the Leagu.e, ror example, the st tes may go 
to war after an attempt at mediation has tailed~ Then, 
nations. outside of these covenants are not attected. Certain 
arbitratlon and mediation treaties have increased the number 
of we.rs that are placed under interdict. But prior to the 
signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact n tions not participating 
J 5 Russell • Cooper, American Consultation in World 
At.fairs (New York: The Macml1!an Company, 1934), p. Io. 
6 M. Briand, "Address Del1ve·red at the Signing of the 
,Pact ot Paris, august 27, 1928," Publication .No. 468, p. 314. 
' Ib1d. , p. 314. 
tn them were at liberty to wage ar unle.ss there were 
specific conventions on this point. For this reason the 
Paet has a double meaning from the judicial viewpoint. In 
the t1rst place> it extends the number or wars interdicted 
for me bers ot the League ot ! ations, nd in the second place, 
states not belongin to the League w111 be bound by the 
interdiction of aggressive warfare ;hen they sign the 
Kellosg Paet. or adhere thereto. 8 
~ side trom its judicial value, the Pa.et is of moral 
worth. In spite or ita imperfections it remains true that 
the treaty solemnly pronounces a basic principle. a.rs, 
hich up to the time of the .. orld 'la.r were recognized as 
legal, are outlawed. The nation which undertakes aggressive 
warfare is pronounced crimin 1. In thia way it is being 
reeognized that public opinion is an important raotor or 
peace. Thus publio opinion, bas-ed on international .orality 
and upon the interests of all humanity can 1n the final 
analysis assure world peace. The Fa.ct will mean what the 
nations and people of the world nt it to mean,. 9 
The multilateral treaty practically takes the control 
of government out of diplomatic circles and places it under 
popular control. The treaty is simple, brier, and toroerul. 
There re no elaborate rules of conduct a.nd no standards or 
~ 8 Dr . Hans Wehberg, Ia.! Outle.;¥ gt ....!! (V ashingto.n: 
Carnegie Endowment ror Internation~Peace, 1g31}, pp. 81-82. 
9 s. L. Gulick," ean1ng ot the Peace Pact , " National 
Edqcati on .Association Journal, XVII (November, 1928), 253. 
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international behavior. !tis not a. legal document but a 
popular .slogan.. lt may be far from accomplishing its in-
ten.ded purpose of settling all international clisputes in a. 
peaceful wa:y, but it leads in the right direotiou. 10 
In England there was much praise t'or the treaty and 
critiois111 for Sir ,A.ustin. Ch1£.unberlain because of his being 
luke .... vrar:m. toward Fsri ti.sh adherenoe. ll People felt ·th!;\t 
never in. the history of diplomacy was there so great 3, 
proposal; so contrived that in the simple a.eeeptanoe ot it 
the world had settled peace to gain. and nothing to lase. 
If the n.at1ons of the world would recognize that peaee is 
VlO:rth while~ agree not to ~o to war, and believe in the 
ttalue at ·their pledge, there 'td.ll be no war.12 
In ,!i speech before the tii.soonsin .Amerioan Legion on 
August 15,. 1928, .!?:.resident Calvin Coolidge declared definite-
ly ln tavot" of the Kellogg Fact as d.rafted. 'l'he part of the 
speech relating to the An1:eriean forei.gn policy follows! 
W'e should ta.ke every precaution to prevent 
ourselves or the rest ot th.e wr.:rr-1'4. fr,,m bei:ug in-
volved. ei.gain in such a tragedy as began in 1914" 
Whilf.1· countries*, national defense shDuld never be 
neglect.ad, ;preparation 1.'or .tr.aintenance of peace 1$ 
likewise required by every hur1,an impulse that stirs 
the hearts of men. 
It :ls in aeoordflnce ,ni th our determination to 
refrain troin aggression and build u:p a sentiriiant. -----,___., ............ ~-. 
lO Sent1,tor tVagner, Q:on~z:..es~iq11r-:J:. }3eLeor_g.., 70 Oong., 
2 Seas~, p. l3G9. 
ll George Glasgow, ~1sir Austin ana. the :1?!lct, 11 Conterr..-
J2..0X:P;!Z 'flt!Vf .. ~:'!, t}XXXIV ( i\Jl,gust , 1928) , 237 4 
12 Ib!d~, 240-241 .. 
and practice among nations more favorable to peace:1 
that we ratified a treaty tor the limitation of 
naval armaments made in 1921, earnestly sought tor: 
·a further extension of this principle in 1927 end 
seeured the .consent or tourtee.n important nations 
to the negotiation of a treaty con.demning raoourse 
to war, renouncini it as em instrument of their 
national policy, and pledging each other to seek 
no solution nf their diaagreeruenta exce:pt. by paoi-
tio means. It is hoped othe.r nations will join 
this movement. Had an agreamen.t of this kind been 
.in existence in 1914, there is every reason to 
suppose that it tvould have savrid tl'le situation and 
delivered the wo,rld from all the .misery wh.i cb ,vas 
.ini"l1oted by the great wiir .. 
By taking a leading position in seouri:ug this 
agreement" Wlich is frought with so much hope for 
the progress ot .hUF1anity,; we hc.1.vo demonstrated that 
wh&n we have said we maintained our armaments, not 
f9r $.,Sgression, btrt purely :ror defense. we wex·e 
making a candid statement whieh \\fe were Willing to 
verify by our ae ti<ons .. 
l sh.all. not n.o:;;,; go into a discussion of '.the de-
tails ,or impliea.tions of this agreement other than 
to point. out, tY1,;1.t of course it detx·aot,s nothing from 
the right and obligation er ourselves or the othe.r 
hi.sh contracting pc.rties to :n:,.ain.t.ain ,<;;1.n a.<lequei.te 
national defense against any ~ttaok, but it doss 
pledge ourselves not to fi.t,tack others in coneidex·a-
tion for· their agreement not to attack us, and to 
seek a settlem.ent or ou:r controversies one w·ith 
another through peaeeful means. 
t)"hile it would be too much to suppose that war 
hs.n been enti.rely· banis11ed, yet a new .lmd important 
barrier·, reasonable and honorable, has bee11 set up 
to prevent it. ~his t"gree:mant proposes f:. :.i:•avolu-
tionary policy amo.ng uati.ons. lt holds a greater 
hope for r,eaee.ful rslat:i.ons thm was ever before 
given to the world. It those wh.O a.re involved in it, 
having started it, will finish :t.t, its frovision.s 
will prove one of the greatest blessings ever he ... 
stowec1 upon hurianity. It is infitting eonsmF1neti.o~ 
ot the first deoada o.f peace. "' 
In his message to the Senate on December 4,. 1928. he 
13 l?resident C&lvin Coolidge, t"S_peeoh. before the 
Wisoons1n American teg1ou," !!,!! York _Tim.es,, August 16, li25 .. 
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called attention to the tact that even then fifty-nine or 
the sixty-four independent nations had endorsed the ne 
treaty. lie dded: 
I have every reason to believe that they are in 
sympathy with this effort to promote peace, and no 
reason to believe that ny or them •ill refuse in 
due course to beoome a p rty to the treaty. - The 
fact th&t I a;pprove of the treaty is well kno~.n. I 
hope th• t it may come into force with the least 
possible delay, and I should be pleased if the 
Senate would take such aetion during the present 
session as to enable t e United St utes to r a t1.ty tit 
treaty before the expiration or my term ot otfice. 
"1th the president's endorsement of the treaty was a 
letter from the 5ecretary or State giving a brief review or 
the diplomatic negotiations leading to the pproval ot the 
agreement at Paris on ugust 27, together with arguments tor 
its ratifica tion. 
In explaining the treaty he pointed out: 
The treaty for the renunciation or ar is briet 
and simple ••• It contains no reservations or ex-
ceptions, and there are no eoll teral understandings 
which detraet fro . its etfeoti veness or qualify 1 ts 
high purpose. It records the determination of the 
participating powers to abolish war as an instrument 
ot national policy in their relations with one 
another, and to seek only by pacific means the igttle-
ment of any isputes that may arise among the.m. 
German officials ere outspoken in their prediction as 
to the value of the new Pact. ' t a Constitution Day celebra• 
tion at Berlin more than five hundred German officers de-
14 Calvin Coolidge, Senate X'..Xecutive ...,ooument, 70 Cong., 
2 Sess., December 4, 1928, p. f-2. 
15 Frank B. Kellogg, Senate AXecutive Document A, '10 
Cong., 2 Sess., December 1, 1928 , p. 3. 
The press in Par:ts did not of;t'er any adverse er:1.ticism 
to the Pact. France was willi,:ng t,'.) enter int,o a.ny proposal 
to see that it 
his pa.lac.,? h1 
(l-oveJ."i.lli:er.rt has be,311 haJY.PY to ac~eJ,)'t t;.h.r3 
treaty for the renunoiation of war proposed by the 
United 3tate.s ::Joveru:rn.ent. Tl1e proposed ·t.reaty has 
s:in:dlarly b~en accepted by my Gmrernment in ·the 
Do11:inicins aztr.l my Gr..,vc:,rnn1e:11,t in India. It is ITiJ! 
confident expects.ti.on that v,,b.en completed it 1;v!ll 
,;m1stitu'te st n1~ and i:mpor·t::u1t guarantee of the 
torld' s peaoe • 
. AJ'i e:t'feot ot the anti-war treaty is to in.crease 
:n"aterially the influence of the United Jtates in :european 
afte..irs.. !he ~~1:erict\:n ecouom1o atructu:i."'e neoessi tat;es world 
peace. Tb.e world Oi;tll: have purchasing po,wer only if there 1s 
peace. The i1nportance of the Paet ot Paris can hardly be 
overestimated in view of' bu:ildi143 up trade mno:ng nfitions .. 19 
has already been 1:nentionad, men in high pla.oes did 
n.ot all agree 'tlla:i the Briand-Kellogg :Pact, was a. means ot 
;preventing wa:r or even of making its reeu.rrence les.13 likely. 
16 
17 20, 1D28. 
'Treaty en Jtc:Heri ... 
{ October 1 li28} 1 
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]4:1os.t of the adverse ori ti.cism seems to arise from, the mean .. 
ing that is rsad into the treaty in the in'terpretution.s and 
reservations.. The original p1•oposi tion ot Secretary Kellogg 
was an unoo11diticntl rarruncia.tion of war. The troaty as 
qualified by its rocervaticrrn constitutos no renunciation 
or outla:v.r.ry of war but in tact and in la.v.r a soletil'i. sanction 
tor all wars .ment1.oned iri t,he exceptions and qu:alifioations)~O 
These ar.e the reservationz, briefly· su.t:tta.rized... {l} The 
Fact doe:, not r0strict self ... detense. {2) Rights under the 
I..ee.gu.e of lfotio:rw tmd Locarnc treaties are not Cif'fectea.. 
(3) O·t.her neutralitJl tre.Qties ai~c to be res:pooted. {4) Great 
Britain's spheres or sr,eeial influence are recognized .. 
On Mr. Kellogg's 011:in et~.te:ment we.rs waged in self-
defense are recognized as legal.. l1.t th,~ s~J!Y3 ~ime :ill 
countries are free to deter1rine when r. war :ls de,fensi ve. 
Had the I;·e.ct 'been in existence in 1914 the ;:;,orld War ·would 
not have beert averted because thE leaders clair::.ed to be 
acting in self-defense. 21 If nations are allowed ,vithout 
restrictions to decide vrhat is a defensive war,. it is diffi-
cult to think of any war in the future that would not be 
placed in th&t oate3ory .. Instead of outlawing w&r as the 
treaty pretends to do~ it places a specific sanction on 8J'l1 
20 Ed\rl:n Borehard, "'Addre.ss Delivered at the V:iilliamston 
lnstitute or Politics. Au.gust 22~ 1928,., ,Senate Dooum.ent 176, 
(Washington: United States Government :Printing Otf'ice, 1929 J', 
p. a. . 
21 F .. E. Bi:mont'ta, fl Should the ,Senate Ratify the Kellog 
'Treaty?-n !'O~, LX:KXI (.ran.nary, 1229)., 27. 
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ri.rm.:r that is liksl'il' to be nrom.ulauted. thaoretical renuneia-1 • ' • • ~ ~ ~ 
I 
flon of wa:r: us an instrument ot nation1;1l policy 11as li't;tle 
t:Jaope tor applicatlon in viet, of ooncreta wr1rs which the 
Paot se.netions.. It is idle to presume that ttiese oftlcial 
not as nracb an integral _part of t:Ue document as it they had 
been written irrco the t,reaty.22 
Kellr.:igg l?ac·t; vmuld mtdte 1:10 dli':f'orEu1ce from a p:ra.e·tical point 
o{' vieiv alnco therfl w,0ls no dotiniti.on of an aggressive vla.r .• 23 
Aga:b1, it 'Hill be notioed that the .British cl~im ·ta the 
recognized as one of' those undefined regions, and still not 
94 are likely to cc our~,.;;. · 
B2 Borobard, Senate DQcument 176, p. 5 .. 
·23 George Glasgow; "Kello.gg .Paet, 11 Con,·temiorarz Review, 




fied. !\'Tone of the 11 ttle nm.tions see1ned quite satisfied. 
public addresses on the pledge inst flghting v:erE; quite 
lieved by the sm:tller powers that in the case of a threaten-
' the United 
settlement. 25 
m:.1.tlor from :r:::i.pt\11 to the 
nnd. reservntlom~ attached to the 
TNhat the :peo:ple of Europe ncttHJlly thinl: o:r th~1 Kellogg 
:press. They feal that they muEi.t utter vi'ords of _prai.se and 
agreement becE:.u.se tliey cannot afford to eiffenc1 .,:\n:eric.s .• 
The elngle 1neasure of their re;1l sen.timeut is to he found by 
<;~ .... ~ • W. Davis, 
ber 19, 1928), 8GO .. 
11:B'oreign Or•inion, :i Outlook, CL (S.eptem-
K - - "'"' - -
26 tt A Japanese Statesman Disctu .. :3~H1 tl1e Kellogg Paet, n 
;!tivi~!s ~W:E.t QGCXZX5JII (Decen.iber 15~ l92g), 510 .. 
4 ea:reful study ot' their :reservations. 27 1'.i'he Kello~ pro-
posal does not appeal t-o the intellects or Europeans. To 
sign a 'treaty to renounee we.r ·would be like signing one to 
:renounce poverty. Ta x·enouno.e pove1·:ty woulu. not give pros-
perity.. ':.'ar cannot be abolished by ,1 mere deela.ratio:ta. re-
nounoing it. It must be done by rooting dovm into tile 
ca.uses and. removing them. :::iith no enforcing a.ot they do 
not think that the Pact oan aecom.plish muoh..28 
By the overwi1elming vote of' eigb.ty-:f'ive to one t nine 
absent, the .Senate on J'anuary lo, 192'9, consented for the 
United States to become a part.y to the nn.d.tiJ.ateral. treaty 
renouncing war as an instrument o:f na tiona.l policy. At 
the 'tine the Senate voted suor1 a larr;e .m.ajori ty in favor ot 
the treaty, many did so under the pres.sure oi' public d.e:mand 
ratb.er than through oonvietion tl'!at it vras of prao'U.cal 
value. 29 Statements from i.r1dividual. s.eu.ators bear out this 
view. Sena:tor Swanson, although favoring the treaty, felt 
that it was a friendly gesture but as an actual pea-0e pact 
would be found ineffective and disappointing. Senator F$SS 
did not belierve the treaty \0ve.s a guarantee against wa:i:·. He 
thout!ht the great.est result tQ be hoped i~rom it was the aug-
i!ientation of the spirit of peace ,~1a.l11st- that of war. 
27 F. H. Sirnonds, ,rK.ellogg Proposal,"' Review ot Reviews, 
I~ntVIII ( July ~ 19.St>) , sn .. 
00 1:~... I'lulla:r-d, nr.uro_pe a.nd the KellOg,f~ Treaty,« ~-
look, OL (Saptember 12, 1928}, 768 .. -
29 George 1H .. Wickersham, ''Paet o:r Paris: A ·Gesture or· 
a Pledge ,n Foi-eisn Af1'a.ir.s, .VIl {J.pril, 1929}, 356 .. 
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Senator Carter Glass, ·while voting for the :peace paot, said 
that he was not willing tor the people of Virginht to think 
that he was s.imple enough. to suppose that it was worth a 
postage stamp in the direction o.f accomplishing international 
peace,. senator Bruee attacked the treaty because of its 
la.ck ot sanctions. He believed that whatever its face 
value might be, 1 t had been largely de.s·troyed by the inter-
pretative notes.30 
Still another a.et ot the Senate as a whole whieh 
showed laek of confidence in what they had done was that 
immediately after the ratification ·Of the treaty they begro1 
the consideration ot an aot authorizing the oonstru.etion o,t 
fifteen nev, cruisers. 51. 
While representatives or the fifteen original sign.a .... 
tories in Paris on oe~asi.on of the signing of the 13:riand-
Kellagg P.act spoke or the impressiveness o.f' the occasion,. 
the I:talian press correspondent ot ll 1,t'evere ironically re-
marked, ttPeaee will re.ign perpetually .• '1 Be was sar,oaetie 
1n hie comm~nt about. the poasibl.e ettect or the treaty, 
saying that people had no faith. in it. ilthough Italy was 
represented., her soul was absent because she saw no tae.e1:na-
tion in inter.national justice, "!he United State$. Engumd, 
and France were rich," he observed.32 
In the Japanese Privy Council o.n interesting diseussioa. 
arose over ratification o-t the, treaty to renounce v-1ar as an 
instrtll'llent of national policy because of the \'faY arti.ole 
one is worded.. It states: ttThe High Contracting Parties 
aolemnl.y declare in the names ot their respect! ve· peoples 
that. they condemn reoourae to war .. • .. '"' l?ow in J'apan the 
e1nperor reserves the prerogative ot making war end oonduet,ing 
t:rea.tles without reference to the popular v1!ll.. :It was 
thought that the J'apanese Government should :m-~ke :reservation 
deelar1ng thi.s Royal prerogative .. 3:3_ Thia resulted in the 
following interpretative note: 
The Imperial Government deolares that the 
phraseology 'in the names or their respective 
peoples' appearing 1n Article I of the treaty tor 
the renue1at1on of war, signed August 27, 1928, 
vie·wed in the light of the provisions of the Im-
perial O~nstitution is understood to be 1nappl1-
oable in so far as Japan is eoncern.ed.34 
t~lhat was the meaning o:f l\r.rlerioan participation in a 
world-wide treaty renouncing war? The people ot Europe 
hoped that the treatJ and negotiations leading up to it 
wou.ld mean that the United States was onoe more showing an 
i.nterest in the peace problem. lt was felt that peace in 
Europe could not be stablized without the sympathy, en-
couragement and support of the Uni te4 States. 1len1 Europeans 
were enthusiastic about the treaty because t.hey hoped 1 t 
35 "lapan•s Debate overt.he Kellegg Peace :Paet,tt 
tivin5 Age, CCCDXVI., (lune. ,1929) , 248. 
34 1Jf ew York Times , July 25 1 1929 • .....,..._..._ ................ · 
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meant the. end of estrangement between. Europe and 1U'tierice. 
which followed the War.35 
·. The expression was :rr.ade that the Pact would keep the ,. 
nat:ions of Europe at peaoebecause none of them. were strong 
enough to wage a war without the tinan.oial l1ssistanee or 
the lJ:r.i ted States• and this they would not like·l.1 get under 
the P.act.. T.lle Government or the United States has thus be-
come the great arbitrator 1n European polities.36 
Europe sees in the Paet no millennium but a prc>mise on 
the part of the United Sta.tea that if trouble comes, i.ts 
efforts to preserve the peaoe·will not be multiplied by the 
aeti.on or a gre·at na.t-ion tha. t h,as ref'u.sed to join the :fore es 
i.t has assembled.. The obliga.tion J..merioa has assuraed is a 
light one. Legally, it amounts to little, if anything .. 
)Jiorally, 1 t means that .li.meriea will not be indi.fferent 
should peace be broken... By .implication, at. l.east, the 
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United States will not make a common cause w:l.th the of tender. 5? 
The treaty 1tse1t ls silent on the que.stion of using 
sanctions as a means of enforcen1ent. The Committee on 
Foreign :Relations in the United State$ Senate, however, 
gives the following inte:rpretat.ion: 
:,5 A. Bullard, 0J.urope and the Kellogg Treaty," .2!11-
:took" CL (September 2, 1928}, 768w 
36 . (. . . .. ) "!!I J!atio,n, CXXVII October l?, 1928 , 400. 
37 J. T. Gerould, "Kellogg Pact and Reparations.settle-
ment as Steps toward Peace,» C;qrr,ent Mistori, llIX (February. 
1929) • 855. 
The eo.arlltlltteo further understands that the 
treaty does iiot provi.de san<.rtions, express or ila-
pliad. Should .an.y slgnatory to the treaty or OJlY 
nation adheri.ng to the ·treaty, ,riolate the t.erms of 
the same, there is no obligation, or oorr.ndt:t:v.9nt, ex.-
press or implied, upQn t1le :part of any of the other 
signers of the treaty to enga.se in punitive or co• 
ez·cive measures a.s agains't the nation violating th.a 
treaty. The effect or the violation or the treaty is 
to relieve the ether signers of th.e treaty from any 
obligation under 1 t with the nat.ion violating the 
same. 
In 0ther vatords, t-he treaty does not, either· 
expressly or impliedly, contemplate the use ot 
force or coercive measures for i'ts entorcerilent as 
against any· nation viol.a.ting it. It is a voluntary 
pledge upon the part of each nation that it will 
not have recourse to war,, exoept in self'-d.ef ense, 
and that it vdll not seek settlement or its inter-
national eon.troversies except through pacific means • 
.. ~d if a rurtion sees proper to disregard the treaty 
and violate the sam.e. the efteet of suoh action ls 
to take :1 t from under tlie benefits of the treaty 
and to relieve the other natio~from any treaty re-
lationship with the said powe·r .. · 
What then shall be tb.e punishment of one v:ho violates 
the treaty by p~ovoking a ·war? In the preamble of tll'4S 
t,reaty one reads 
••• any signatory Power which shall heraatter 
seek to ;promote i.ts national. interests by res<1rt to 
war should be denied the benefits furnished by this 
treaty; 
There is no legal obligation in the Paet of Paris upon 
tbe tfnited States or any other signatory to join in public 
aetio:n. against a:ny state which c.hooses to run a.muek in tbe 
world, and no external body is ealled upon to point out. the 
duty to the signatorle.s in case ,riol.ation oeours.. The Qnly 
reference to the problem ls the phrase in the ,pre1:Utible Just 
00 »J£7u.ltllateral or Kellogg Trea:~y. ii Senate ·noc.um-@t. 
Report No. l, 70 Cong ... , 2 Sess., pp .. 2 ... 3,. 
5? 
quoted. The novelty of this method of appro oh is that in-
stead of enumer ting the duties of tbe l w-a.biding states, 
it denies th aggressor the right too loul t upon con-
tinued friendly relations. It does not aay th t those rela-
tions ill be broken, but, 1n leaving the sign tories tree 
to take this step, points to it a ral duty. 39 Since an 
aggressor" is not defined in the treaty, each state ig it 
O\m. judge as to whether a violation has occurred or not. 
Friends of the Pct of Paris oonsider that one ot its 
speoi l merits is the fact that 1t contains no sanctions, 
1or if it did, thsre would be 1ogical. grounds on the part 
ot those not Willing to subject tho United St tes to the 
determinations of any toreign country or league or countries. 
The ellogg P ot 1s of praotical value. \Why m not a 
trlendly. gesture have important rPsults ilthin tho field ot 
international rel t1ons?40 Again, le.ck of sanctions is no 
argument against the Pact or Paris, tor after ll no treaty 
~ s any sanctions bey~nd the plighted word of th~ sign tory 
41 na.tio11 . 
In answering the cr1t1c1mn th t there 1 no means of 
anf.orcing the tre ty, .so eta.ry ;eilo g says: 
39 Shotwell, Renuno1at1on .2f. _£ !.! £! Instrument ot 
{~tional Policz, pp. 221-222. 
4o '. s,. yers., " ellogg Pact. nd the ··uestion or a.no-
tions," "'\merioan c dem.l .f!.t Political~ Social Se1e-nce, 
LIV (.Tul • l929)t 59. 
41 Senator ·'agner, ~OJ'.!8ressional Record; 70 Cong., 
2 Sees., p. 541 . 
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My personal opinion is that all.ianoes ha:te been 
futile in the past and will be 1n the future; that_ 
the carrying out of this treaty must rest on the 
solemn pledges and honor of nations; that it by this 
treaty all the nations solemnly p.ronounoe against 
war as an institution for 1!\lettling :i.nternation.al dis-· 
putes, the worlu will have taken a step f'orv.'.!ird 1 
erea.ted a public opinion,. martia.led the great moral 
forces · of the ,\lOl' 1'1 tor its observance, and entered 
iuto e. sacr@d obligation 11hich :·dll m2tlre it. far rn.ore 
ditriei2t to plunge the world into· another great con-
flict. 
If tiivo or more riationa w'hioh a1·e parties to a dispute 
seek et paei.fio settlement some means e~ sure.lf b~ found. 
lt is impossible at the presemt time wi~h the existing 
m.a.ohinar1 or international rel.a.tions for an1 two eountries 
trying to do so to i'ail to reach a paeitie se.ttlement ot a 
dispute betr-1een tb.em. .Besides di:reot diplomacy, there are 
various t,tt;bltration tribunals, the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, ·Comm1ss1ons of Inquiry and ot Conciliation, 
and the mediation and consultation ot other pov1e.rs.. Al-
though n:o definition of an a~essor has been mentione.d, 
eaen signatory has a moral obligation to place responsibil1.ty 
in case war is provoked. 
Suppose there are two parties to an ·1nter11ational dis-
pute; if both ot them seek to settle it by pacific means, 
the dispute will be settled and there will be no wu .. If 
one of them refuses pacific means, then war results and the 
The criteria given by 1::. Herriot at the Fifth ASsemb1y 
42 Irrenk B. Kellogg, '1R-enuneiation of YZilr, n _n_e_v_ie:_w_· ot 
Reviev-:s, Lll"VIII (Deoe:mber, 192.9), 600. 
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of the League of Nations might v:ell be accepted.. The aggres-
sor, aoeord1ng to him, was the party who rtiif'used arbitration 
and resorted, to war. 43 
legal meP...ns of settling international disputes, :rules govern-
ing the conduct or any war may be regarded as binding. In 
other words, are the Hague end Geneva Conventions oonoerning 
the humanitarian procedure 1n case or war sti11 in etrac,t 
after the Kellogg Pe.et comes into force?' It international 
law proeoribes war, it is di:tt1cult to admit that 1 t should 
establish at tho same time p~inciples ror its eonduet in 
ce.se :! t should break out.. It 1.s hard to believe, however, 
that belligerent states would :revert to tha inderdioted 
$.rms, :w..assaore of prisoners, eto .. • used in med.ieval ti.mes. 
Humane methods of Vl'arfare may still be said to claim a 
moral.. foree. Itloreover, the fear that opponents may resort 
to methods just as cruel will' prompt each side to conduct 
its war as humanely a.a possible, if one may think: of hu:m.anitJ 
at all in this eonneotion.. 
Bttt even arter the Kellogg Pact is in effect the laws 
of war will still reta,in a judicial force, for war as a rule 
may be rtgarded as contrary to law on one side only. so tar 
as ,one party 1s concerned, it will be p6rzr-issible as a war 
of sanction or ael:f•det'ense. This fa,ct does not, in reality, 
modify tbe question under di seuss:ton. '1.l1e laws ot war apply 
45 Miller>~ Peace l?ac,t .91... Paris, p. 12.'l. 
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either to both belligerents. or to neither one. If' the 
party violating the Kellogg Paet is not required to eoramit 
its crlme acoo:rding to certain rules, the other party is 
l1kewt,e exempt from observing the law ot war. Dut it seems 
mo.re probable that these will become obsolete only if the 
Paet is·aueoesstu.l in preventing war.44 
There is another important consequence wh1 ch re.tii"ioa·• 
. -
tion -ot the Kellogg Pa.,,t may have for all nations adhering .• 
In future, in ease of a war o:t aggression bf a s.tate, the 
citizens of that. state will have the right to· :refuse .mili-
. tary servi0e. In :faot, this will be their duty. tor inter• 
national law takes precedence ever the laws of individual 
states.. If international law makes war a. crime, the oiti-
aens or a state should abstain from part1oipa.t:ton. in that 
crime. This interpretation may be deducted on the f'ollow-
int!. ground. Article om9 of the Kellogg Paet declares ntha t 
the High Contracting ;arties·:renounca war in the name ot 
their re.speeti ve peoples. n In. a certain measure this places 
the tre~ty under the guarantee or the, people th~mselves .. 
Gl 
Thus the people are under obligations to strive with all their 
power for the real.1zatiou of the •nds ptttsued by the treat7. 45 
In the correspondence which t.ook plaee during the 
proee$s ot negotiu.ting the treaty, t-he fifteen original 
signatories made olau that the peace pact was 1n no v;l!J.y to 
1mpa1r or limit their obligation.a under the League of Nations, 
Loearno, and other existing neutrality tre ties., Similarly 
in the report from the Committee on Foreign Relations in 
the United States Senate e read: 
This treaty in no respect changes or qualifies 
our present position or relation to any paot oi&treaty 
existing between other nations or governments . 
In explaining the obligations of those who are signa-
tory to the Pact and also members ot the League ot Nations, 
it shou1d , be pointed out that the enforcement or pe Qe under 
the Covenant ay be in th~ nature or a detensiTe war. It 
might be defined as cooperative defense both in theory atld 
int ot. The theory is derived from article eleTen, para-
graph one, or the Covenant of' the League ot N. t1ons, v-b.ich 
reads 
••• the League shall take any action which may 
be deemed wise and effectual to EJateguard the peaee 
of n.ations. 
A more definite state ent regarding the use of military 
sanctions is found in article sixteen, paragraph two. 
It sh 1 be the duty of th Council to recommend 
to the several Governments concerned what ertective 
military, naTal or a1r force the Members of the 
League shall severally contribute to the armed forces 
to be used to protect the covenants or the League. 
This is cooperation in the truest sense of the word, 
tor there is no $ttper-State h1eh can command the members 
of the League. Action is taken only by the tree will o~ 
each participating goTernment. The d,etense of the community 
44 " t1latera.l or Kellogg Treaty,tt Senate Document, 
Report No . l, '10 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3. 
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of nations is tllus ir1 the hands of tree but responsible 
wembe1,s. 47 
If this interpretat:ton is aoceptecl, then renun~iation 
with outlawry o.f v1ar. Outlawry should call for a whole new 
Renunciation, on the otber , o.s set forth in this 
o.lares for itself tlie conditions of. i'ts own exercise of 
D"''\'J'-"'r 48 , 4, '.i,J. ~ • 
Iri the letter wh:ioh aecretary Kellogg sent to the four-
Ptwt 1Ji1ith the League by sb.ovdng tlle Le2i.tiua did not re• 
<;tuire posU;ive railit,ary sanctions. He said: 
The Gr)ve:na.nt irnrioses no !21.ffir.mati ve primary 
obli~a-tion to go to war. The obligation, if any, 
is secondary rind attaches only vihen deliberc.tely a~-
oepted by· a state. Artiele 10 ot the Covenan:t has, 
for e:xrunple, been i:nte:r1lreted by a .resolution sub- · · 
mi tted to the F'ou.rth Assembly but not form.ally 
adonted o.·wint~ to one adverse r1ote to mean. that r it 
is for the oonstituttonal. &.Uthorities to decide, in 
reference to th£, obligation of 1:ireserving the in.depen-
d.enoe and integrity of the territory of :members, in 
ivha:t; degree the mJ:H~ber is bound to t1.ssure the execu-
tion of t,his obligation by the employment o:f i.ts 
tnilitary forces.' tfhere is, in my opinion, no neaes-
sar)' inconsistency beti'lieen tbe covenant and the idea 
of an unqu.ali:fied renunciation of war. r;he covenant 
can, 1 t 1.s true, be e onstrued as authorizing war in 
-------------------·------------
IJ/l 81'.l.otv:1ell, m:tbe !3aot of Par ls, ~1 Irrtern:ltional ,Q.;q!• 
<.liliatton no. 2·?.13, (October, 1926), 19 .. 
'ffi. I'k· 1· ·• · 1m ~·' :P·• .·.f.;J/· 
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certs.. in ciroumst.anoes but 1 t. is an !lttthor1zat1on and 
uot a positive raqu.irement.49 
Uiembers of the League Assembly, however, recognized 
some inoons.isten,oy between the Kellogg ?aot and the Coven~,.nt 
t.Qr in their meeting in September, 1929, s1ight changes 
were suggested to bring the coven.ant more closely in ke·eping 
with the spirit of ·the Kellogg l?aot.. Aside from sligh.t 
' ' 
eb.angea in the wording of articles t\velve, thirteen, and 
fifteen. the significant phrase. nl.1lle.y agree t:'.o.at they Y¥1.l1 
in .no ease reso1·:t t.o ~'at', 1t was added to a.rtiole twelve, 
par~raph one~ 50 iIOl-w-ever. this did not receive the nsoea-
sar:, ratifications to become eftecrtive. 
In explaining the parteot harmony between the Loe1.imO 
I"Teaties and the Fact, li".ll" .. Kellogg gave the to1lowing 
satisfactory explanation: 
It the parties to tb.e treaties of Lo~e.rno are 
under any positive obligation to go to war, suoh 
obligation certainly would not atitaeh until one of 
the parties . has reaort.ed to war in violation cf 1 ts 
solemn pledges thereunder. It is therefore obvious 
that i:f all the parties to the l.ocnrno treaties, be-
came parties to the multilateral anti-war treaty 
proposed by the Un.iteid States. there wot1ld be a 
double assurance thQt the tooarno treaties would not 
'.ba violated by recourse to ar.ma. In such event 1 t 
would follow that resort to war by any state in 
violation of the LO<:Hlll"nO treaties would also be a 
breach of the muJ.tile:teral anti·v~irar treaty and the 
other parties to the ant!,-wsr treaty would thus as a 
mirtte:r of law be automatically released tro.m their 
obligations thereund!r and free to fulfill their 
Looarn:o commitments •. · l. 
-·---------------------
49 -n-~t..11 "'j ' ...... ,1-.:'t.W ea ti .on "o. 
50 Wehber.r.,•. The Outla\i'l";: of -r;ar, pp .. ea...sn. o~ ............ _.. _........,.~ 
O.l "Dn~11,,.,,,t1An "'~0 A &Im. P ,::c, • ..... u . . ·v,,;,. v ~'ii· • '11:UQ ll . · •· vU· • 
. ' 
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l,notb.er striking feature of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty 
is that it is :perpetual .. It contains no limiting clause 
or provision tor d.eterm1:nation or denunciation.. It J.asts 
for all time except tor the theory that al1 parties might 
agree to end it. This is highly improb&.ble .. Indeed, the 
preamble indicates th.et the treaty ·would not be termin11ated 
or abrogated. by its violation, even a .. s to a delinquent 
:party; the aggressor is merely deprlved et its beneTi ts. 
The iror1ortanee or such perpetuity i.s almost impossible to 
overestimate. Recent treaties without a li11iting clause 
are almost unknown. Expe:rien.oe has shmvn that interniit1onal 
agreern.ent.s looking to the :ruture should be sub.jeet. to re~ 
vision,, ·One erroneous asaertion ab.out- vdthdra:wa.l from the 
Le~~tte ot Mat:tons in 1919 and 1920 was that a state would 
.have to re.ma.in a · member unles& the other powers consented 
to 1 ts v£i thdritwa.l .. 
Here, however, is a t.reaty- proposed by the United 
States v,rhe:re the question.. of' withdrawal is not even arguable .. 
States are bound t·orever ·and ever. The promise or es.ch 
state made t{l ru.l the ethers runs in perpettdty, unless 
there ia untln.imous eo11sant to ter1uinat1on, limitation, or 
revislon.. :rt is a treat:, dravm on the basis that eondi.-
tions .may change,. but not tile treaty. whi.eh is to fit them 
all, now and hereafter)>2 
It is vital to observe that the Ke.llogg-B.riand Treaty 
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is a ~alit'ieatioa ot t~e United Ste.tea Constitution, ~ot 
·,. 
an uientl.mentt for that would not be technically correct, 
but it .makes aa real a ohfu1,:nge in the Co.natl ttttion at the 
United Statas Q;S a:a amendment. If this treaty is o»served 
in goad ta.1th on the part or the United States, the war-
.m.ak:1ng: power ot Congress undie,r the Constitution is rad1oally 
altered and 111.dted.. The Constitution givos Congreatil po~-er 
to declare war; this in11)lies when Congress chooses, for 
good re,~son, fer poor reason, 01 ... tor :ao l"'6.fd11011 at all.. Eut 
with this ·treaty Cong.reas nay not declare war as an instru-
ment of' natiQnal .l,H:>licy; ·it may do so only in cases of 
self-defense and the like vtaere the t~eaty has been viola-
ted by another powar. 
The change is great; the difference is profound; 
?le may se11ae it if we consider s.orae of our past 
history; with such .a 'Trea.ty th$ war or 1812 with the 
British would not have taken place; with such a 
Trea.ty we oould not start another such war· as that 
with 1:;1exioo; with such a treaty the 3pau.ish War is 
not imaginable. 
Iiot only does the United States but all other powers 
by acceptance or· this treaty limit their tre,edom of o.ctio:n 
under the hitherto .accepted rules of international law; am 
like other powers having a -wr.it"ten oonstitutlon, the United 
States limits its O\ffl freedom under tbe fundamental :ta.w; in 
t\ real sense {perhaps not in a legal sense), tbe Constitu-
tional powers of Congress are curtailed.55 
At this point it rdght ba we.ll to review briefly the 
history of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.. On April 6, 1927, the 
tenth anniversary of the entrance or the United States into 
the Great lf:?ar, J:tr.isthle Briand announced in the newspapers 
that Fra.nee iiVOUld be willing to sign an agreement with the 
• l(ellogg 
suggestetl t11i:it other countries be invi tad to join. this 
measure.. The result ot the negotiations t,'waa that on August 
fif'teen states signed 
ttls.ny other 11.atio.ns aoon subscribed, ;;:1.nd tha treaty was 
of national policy" and to seek the solution of all dis-
pointed out Uw,t tl1e declaration ainounted to very .little, 
ainetl there were reservations whlch '\?Vere understood, tal-
served the rigl:rt to make 1Yar i,n ael.t-defense; against any 
stute whioh v'lolated the d.eela~atton; in oases :providei tor 
reservatio.n is the ro.o.s:t important one.. l.t is of course 
that it is a war of self-de.tense. The Worl<l War was re-
garded by the people in ea.ch country eoneerned as a war of 
self-defense. Nevertheless, the deolara.tlon to outlaw war,. 
although it does not e.bol1sh war, creates a stron.6 moral 




Ten Year$ under the Paet 
-~.· ............................ 
~e Briand-Kell<,gg Paet which had been signed August 
27, l92B, had not yet be·en torma.ll;r promulgated when it 
met its first severe test in the Far East. China and the 
Union et soviet Republi.os had become embroiled in a bl tter 
eontrove.rsy over th$ control of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
in Northern. ;!lanohuria, and both _parties displayed such 
bellieoeity that war appeared imminent. 
The controversy arose over an alleged violation ot the 
Sino-Russian railway agreement of 1924. By this agreement 
e.ontrol or the railroad was di vi.ded betv;een the two, govern• 
msnts with the further understand.iug that eaoh government 
.further agreed to retrain trom any propoga.nda against the 
political or social system of the other. Feeling between 
the two governments became incree.singly unfriendly, e1a.d in 
1927 China toreed the Russian ambassador to leave Peking 
because or alleged Soviet respons.ibility :f,ar communist 
. uprisin.g;a.. Oordial relations had :not been fully established 
\~hen on May- 2f, 1922, Ollinese O·fficials raided the Soviet 
consulates in tour tJanchurlan cities, claiming that co:nmu-
nist propaganda. was being distributed from these consulates 
contrary to international law and specific agreemants .. 1 
On tfuly 10,, the Cbines.e president of' the railroad took 
l Ru.ssell M. Cooper, Jt..meri¢an Consultation in Yiorld 
Affairs,, p. S'i .. 
a more tlra.stio step by dismissing the Russian 1nanager, the 
propaganda and to safeguard China's interest in the Chines$ 
Chi.nese to assw1Ie greei.ter control over the :railroad at the 
expense o.f Russia, the soviet Government interpreted these 
arbitrary acts as a deliberate attempt of the Oh.ineae to 
violate the Plgree.1:t:e:nts of 1924 and. gain control. :Rfaturally, 
a oontrover.sy ensued. In a vigorous protest on July 13 
Russi!l delivered an ultimatum to China dem.and.i.ng restoration 
of .Russian riglrts /li\nd a conference to settle all rail~.ray 
questions. China replied on July .17 without eom.plianoe and 
Hussi,:1. irer;iediately severed diplomatic relations and suspended 
railway oo:tr.murlicat:1011.s. 2 l5oth countries 11J.assed troo:pa on 
the Hanoburian border, creating a situation s,o tense that 
there was real dangesJ:- that the controversy :might develop in-
t.o a vJa.r.,. 3 
Briand-
polioy o..ncl agreeing to settle all disputes by~ paci:f'io n1eans, 
and al though the :Pact had not been f'ormally declared in 
ef'.fect, t.hey were under m.oral. obligations to abide by 1.ts 
provisions.. !1fatur.a.1ly the United Stat$s as n:n initiator of 
2 !l,)id., pp .. 87-68. 
S ,rn.,n, \'teu y 0· . .,,.r,,. mi'"'$$ J.;·~t;;:. ~ -~ • ·.,~(2,_-_ ._ ., J'uly 17, 1929. 
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the Pact v1as muoh concerned tha.t the prineiples emborlied in 
the treatl,"" be resp(~eted :tn this instance. On July 18 i1r. 
Stir11son' s :ti rst step v;zcs t'i confe.re11ce wi tll Dr. Chao-Cho \'!u, 
the Chinese nianister in Washington. 4 He explained to nr .. 
\'iu his desire for a peaceful settlement and called the 
latter's ottentlon to China's obligation ris e. aignatory ot 
sirr,ilc1r course li'ti th aoviet Russi r;.. Thi::: hope was fulf !lled 
t,he next morning when the .TI'rench Foreign Minister, Eriand, 
transmitted the appeal to the Russian i\.mbassador, novg:alevski, 
and to the Chinese E:inister Kao Lou, at P@ris.5 The use ot 
'the French C-0vernment was necessary bec.ausc of the lrHrk of 
assurance that their Governments were in accord 'Nith that of 
the 11nited Stta.tes. i 
Gov•3rnment was received, ISini.ster ':'Tu. indicated that it would 
4 Ioid .. , July 22, 1929 .. 
5 Ibid., July 20, 192~. 
6 Cooper, J,1neriean Consultation JJ! World J,.ffa1rs, 
pp. 89-0l .• 
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be favorable. I!e declared: • 
Anything we put our signatures t,o w11l be ad• 
hared t.o,,. .iUth.:>ugb. tlle Kellogg Paet is not yet 
formally in effect,. China has no intention o:r usini 
feree in the present eontroversy.7 
Siniilarly, the Russian response vtas o.f a conciliatory 
nature. In an interview with !,.m.erioa.n correspondents on 
July 19, J"an Rudzuta.k, the. Russian Commissar of Railroads 
and aeting head of the Ru.seian Government., announced: 
Unless or until the Chinese or the t'hite Guards 
attack us,. no single Russian soldier \'Ifill set foot 
on Chinese territory ..... 
We know the masses demruid drastic ation. VJe 
know our stre.ngth and the Chinese weaknesses, but 
our pacific pronounoernents are not just words. Our 
signature to the .Kellogg Feet was not just a diplo-
matic ge.sture.. When we talk of peace, ivre .mean peaee ,. 
and when we condemn tr1e imperialist policy of foreign 
i:owers detending6thei:r interests in China by foroe we were sincere. 
On luly 22 !l!tr. Stirnson announced that he had reoeived 
te.vorable replies and that both Chi.na and Russia had torn1dly 
deolared their intention ot refraining from hostility ex• 
eept in t,1elf'-detense. T.hs Chinese oftloial response came 
from Dr. l'u, I!iniste.r to the United States; the R.ussian 
reply was received through Paul Olamlel, the French :'~bassa-
dor, upon advice from Foreign Mj.n!ater Br1andt who was noti-
fied of Moscow's attitude by the Russ,,ian Junbassador in Faris. 9 
Tempor$rily, war iifa.s averted. :Probably neither party really 
? The l{GW York Times, July 20, 1929. 
e Ibid • .............,.. 
o;pportun:i. ty- to e:xrrrasf: their peaceful intentions a.tld t.o 
s,eek a set'tleF1er1t of th.air ccmt,::.:·oversy b:f paeifio means .. 10 
m:1ile the ?aot of ·~\iris eould not be given full oredit 
purpose well.. It fooused the atterttion of the :publio opin-
tta fighting point.11 
c.ction of the United E:tates G·overnment in July, 
f!'lerely tci :maint,::tin p.eaoe; it did nothing 
conflictiJlg interests.. Russia i.nststed upon a restoration 
of t,he §..~ 3J~. ifu~t .. (~~ 1'Jhile China supported the ¥ukden 
G-0ve1·.nm.e:nt in refusing any such oonoession. Still more 
conf'lict betv:aen Russia's r:.mrlety to 
lO Cooper, ll&;aerican Co:ncrultation !!'! Vlorld 2.ffai:rs ~ 
P~ 92. 
ll ;J~ T. Gerould, ''Threat 
Union and China; Ef':feat of the 
Dispute,·~ Gu:rrent ~.;rlstor~, 
of War between the Soviet 
Kellogg Peace Paet on the 
(Sept.eniber, 1929}. 1096. 
way audits zone.12 
Direct neg<>tiations tared poorly, and by August lit 
was olear that an agreement was in1possible, for the Russian 
Government would: accept only a rest.oration of th.a status 
quo ante., which l~ukden refused to grant.. During Aug'Uat and 
September the Hanking and ;Moscow Governments ex:chs..nged notes 
through their represe·ntatives i1t Berlin, being toreed to 
this cu;mbe:rsort1.e procedure in tb.e ab.senee of d.ireot diploma-
tic relations; but again all et:rorts failed.13 
The ensuing ,,eeks were taken up 111 th numerous border 
attacks from both sides, none of which had much mili ta.ry 
V'alue except to aggravate the situation and make some kind 
or settle~mnt imperative. Russia had superiQr military 
strength but hesitated to provoke Vv-a.r, possibly because she 
believed that oontinu.ed border raids would ultimately prove 
ju.st as successful and less costly in both man power and 
prestige. At length, on Iiovember 17, tha Russ.iana decided 
to bring rzatter.s to a head.. They launched a vigorous 
attaek upon »eanchouli end J"al.ai IT-or,. capturing both place.a 
together vdth their Chinese garrisons. This rt.ilite.ry 
disaster spread consternation among the inhabitants of 
Manehuria, and on November 21 rlarshal Chang B:aQeh-liang sued 
for peaoe. The Soviet Go1"ernment stated its terms the next 
12 Cooper, AmGrioan Oonsulta.tion 1! 7!orld .A:ffairs, 
p. 92. . 
13 Harold s. ~uigley, "Civil \C:ar Broak:s out .11new 1n 
Chin.a*H Cu.r1~ent Hi.st;or";r, 1GD::I (December~ 1929}. &15 .. 
• >#' • • ... • • ... • ., 
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day, and on Dfove.mber 26 Marshal Chang; accepted them. A 
preliminary agreement was worked out at Nikolsk-Ussuriisk 
from December l to 3. This settlement, based on the 
Russi,B.n. ultimatun: ot 1'.ruly 13 and the telegrrun of July 25, 
brought an end to hostil.ities and restored nC)rm9.l eonditions 
tn upper Itianohuria.14 
tleanwhile, t,he news ot Russia·•s ottensive into i:i!an-
ehuria had aroused great anxiety in. all or the ma,jor c,api-
tals for war had beooiue 1,,0:re imminent than ever. In 
l:lashington, offie ials ·were especially concerned, not only 
because ot tha oonsequenc.es o,f war, but also beo-ause o.t the 
threat agaiJ:lst the Kellogg '.l:>aet, which w1as now in :force .. 
!1ews di.spatches from 'the region indicated that Russia v;as 
attempting by' :t."oree of &rms to eana.pel aoceptanee ot her 
demands. Tb.is was a direc.t violation of J\rtiole II of the 
Paet. In the m.id,st o'.f this oriais there carr.e two dispa.teh.es 
trom IL:anehuria. further indicating Russ'ia 'as the aggressor 
and urging neutral :intercession under the Kellogg Paot.,.15 
i.s in Iuly t .Seore~rr Stinson determined to bring 
neutral pressure to bear for peace .. To that $:lld he .once 
age.in cansulted 11!!.ith the G·reat Powers in ~ effort., not at 
intervention, but for a recrystallization and expression or 
united world opinion against war. On Jlovem.ber 25, .e.mbassador 
Katsuji Debuchi of Japan ce.lled at the Department of State --------------------~"'-'-·'-')-.»;at-,------
14 Q.uig:ley, "Kellogg Paet: Invoked in Soviet-Chinese 
Dispute,n Our1·eutHistorz. ml (January, 1£1!30}, 758. 
15 Cooper., i:.me1~iean Consulta:tion is t\Torld Affairs, 
p. 95. 
and reviewed the situation with Secretary Stinison and Nelson 
T. John.son, Chief ot the Division of Far Eastern Ati'.airs.16 
This 'm."a$ follov,.red by conversations V>"ith other diplo-
mats, both at '?ashington and in ,other :ro.ujor capitals ot 
the world. At Paris,. London, Tokyo, Berlin, r;md Rome the 
United Stutes Anibrisst1dors brough·t up the qm~stion and in-
vited suggestions, but ·without mnking any definite :propos-
als •. 17 
On Iifovembe.r 26 t,he Chinese Government sent identical 
note a to the indi vidt,al signatorif}n of the Kellogg Fact, 
urging that st'ep.s be taken to hcJ. t the :Russians and lJUtlish 
them for tha.ir invasion of Chinese territory.la 
Vihen. news was recai.1red or Mar shnl Cha.ng' s ,acceptance 
o.f the 3oviet terms of :November 26, the t:eeling in Europe 
and ..ei.merioa be<HJ.me less toen.se.. Unofficial advices from 
1hashington indicated thn1i the danger did not nov1 appear as 
serious as the Chinese at first in.dieated and that collea-
tive action from the Great Powe.rs was :not necessary .. 19 
On 1:lov&mber 20 the Depe.rtm.nnt of utate made it clea:r 
that YJhile it did no·t Ydsh to disru1'.lt negot:1.ations, it 
reared the situation iva.s still tQo grave t.o 1r1arrun.t inac-
tion .. At the sa..me time Secretary Stimson and President 
16 'rhe New York 'Times, November 26, 1929. _.._..~~ . 
111 Ibid ?Jovernber 29. 1929. ~·· ,. 
l8 ~ .. , !~ov"mber 27, 1929. 
19 Ibid. Movember 30, 1929. ----- , 
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Hoover care.fully- considered the situation and talked ivith 
several a.mb.tassadors.. Mr. Stimson said that no intervention 
or .m.ediation vras considered but that influence to mobilize 
1 20 publ·c opinion should be exerted. 
Despite the efforts a.t ~:reement 'INhich were taking place 
at N1kol$k-Ussuriisk, the situation v1t:1S believed sufficiently 
serious to warrant a public statement tor pi:Hiee v1hiob would 
not only arouse ;popular sentiment tlga:lnst furthe·r hostili-
ties, but perhaps be a positive incentive for a successful 
outcome of tb:e negotiations. Great '.Britain, 1?ran<:H!, Italy, 
and the Uni.tea. Stat.es sent statement.s to auss,ia and China 
calling attention to the formal and publio assure.noes that 
nei tller would resort to war unless attacked ~nd at the s1ime 
time ealled attention to 'thelt• obligations under the Paet 
f 'ti . 1· 21 o .. ar s. 
Pact as effective as posslble, i~r. Stimson at the same time 
ea.bled all other nations \'1ho had rati.fied the Briand-
I{ellogg Paet asking that they also send sitnilar mes.sages to 
.R:ussia and China. Thirty-seven of the n.ations associated 
the.n:i.selves with. the United 3tatelf; and sent si:milar notes to 
the t\'lrO powers. 22 
20 ~., December l, 1929. 
21 oooper, ;/\merican Consultation Y! 'i!orlu Afta.ira, 
pp. 98-99. . 
22 Secretary of .StID;te Sti:mson, ff'?he 1i~ar. Ea.stern 
Froblem. *" Interntrtional Concili~.tion llo .• 286 {January,. 
1933), 28. 
insisted ·that m.tlitary actions had been t,aken purely for 
self-protection. a.no. declared thl1t China ·was ready to ·work 
for ;peace. rfhe Russian note of the same date_, delivered to 
the French P,mbassador at l\Co.soow and relayed through f'aris 
to VIashington anticipated ,:.::. peaceful settlement but el:presse-d 
direct negoti.e.tion. It also denied that any state or group 
o:f states had. the right to not in the :function o.f a protec-
tor of th\£, Pa.ct. 23 
On Dace~1ber 5,. Secretary of State tJtiri:ison rep.lied 
na\';rs:pa:per correspondents in Yi'ashlngto11. lJe called att·en-
t1on to the taot that as far back as the Hague Convention 
of l89~ the nations of the world had /Is.greed t~hat at.rangers 
to a dispute could call attention to thG s·tates at VlU"ia11(H\,) 
s.nd the e:x;ereis~ of that right would not be considered as 
an u.11:f'riendly act .. Later that prt:n.eiple·had been reoogniz.ed 
among nations. T'11e note also called attention. to the f.aet 
that pub.lie 01linion v1a.s playing a :part sinee the nations 
c-onoe:r:ned v:1ere in direot nagotiat.ion. He a!4'10unced .further 
that the Chinese Ea.stern Railway question was settled so 
23 Harold s. 
Chinese Iiispute, ff 
'760. 
Q.uigley, nKellogg Paet Invoked in Soviet-
Current fI1storz,. XX.XI (January, 1930) i 
ansv1er the Ru:ssia:n note de11.ou11eing the United fitates f.o.r its 
'"''"'t"' O· n· · !4, t:'.\.-U . 4,- '- -Ls • 
The Sino-Russif1.n eptaode c~lled l'iittention to three 
1.t:r,,portant vreaknesses in tl1e1 J?uot.. (l) Consultation and 
appet21 res;ted. on no recosnized authority. {£} There uu1s no 
!nachine:ry for obtaining t·elhtble infor:mF.:tion in the actual 
state of affairs ::tn the area of hostilities. (3) There was 
:no established and efficient method of conault,ntion \Vhicb. 
v.rou.ld i:nclude a.ll nations. 25 
oped into a tlar had not the other powers eonsulted and n:ade 
ti.on by '.ri.ussJa 
ing developments 
o:retary Btimson•a 
that foreeful rneasures virere used and tbRt they v:ere a 
decisive factor i.n inducing: Chinfa to aecept flu.ssie.' s terms. 
Tt1e appetls of December 2 could not have c1ee1sively 51:.ffeoted 
eally reached, although the preliminary conversations S!lld 
manifest oor1e,ern of the pov1ers may have had some influenoe .. 
t~hate:ver may ht~:ve been t11e effect of the consultc&t,ion of 
B5 Cooper , 
pp. 106 ... 107. 
tion 
delegate., Yfa.s muon disturbed over the lncid.ent, whioh hi,s 
Chinese. £1.ctin~ on instructions from his Ct0vexn.ment, he 
:requested tna.t i11n pursuance of authority given to it in 
---------------·--·-·-~----·· ---1-...-.-----~~----
26 Ibid., p. 108. -
80 
1.:.rtiole XI of the Covenant, the Council takei iJr1U1ediate steps 
to prevent the further development of a. situation endanger-
ing the pe.c..oe ot nations. n !ie :further ntute-d that Chinn. 
was fully ·p.i:-epared to act in conformity with whatever 
recomir;.endat1ons it reoei ved from. the Council and to abide 
by the decision3 of the League or i~ations. 27 
Eaeh country insisted that the other was :primarily 
responsib.le for tho incident. T'.ae J".apcneae delegate urged 
that occup.o.tion of ·the aountry unde1· the circumstances iwas 
neeessflr; tut was teK*Porary, and urged that the mat·ter be 
settlad. ·by direot negotiations betwean t.he two countries. 
:Or. Sze insistod that direct negoti,rtions were impossible 
so long as hostile troops o-0cu;pied Cl1inese territory• and 
urged that the League appoint a aommission of inquiry to 
' give an impartial ticeount of the resl. tacts of ·the situation 
in Manchuria., Ho de:f"inite a.ct;ion was taken, but the Cot1,"'leil 
did determine on three lines at action. 
(1) It appealed. to both countries to refrain trom ac-
:t'u.l settlement more ditticult. (2} Ea.Jh country should en,-
dea.vor to tind means of \\ti thdrawing the troops without 
d;;.;.nger to the lives and property 01· th.e.i:r nationals {a com-
mittee of five was appointed to aid i_n working out this 
arrangement). (3) The United States was to be: informed as 
27 A. t. torMell, tt~:ranehuria, the tea.BUG and the :United 
Sta.tes,n !?or~itp! Mfairs 1 X (April, 1932)" 354-355. 
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eoo:perat ion bet1neen the th1i ted States and the League in 
de n 11• 'I'\.~ ,.,,,, th t" hA (li. <trlU· t"' £S . :C3........,... t.:Li;..,,.~ ''il' -- _....~ - £1,:.,:.,, · ~·- .;;;:;) d . 't..7' 4 
aet1:ng :tnde:penclently * 
t" take suc11 stepn under the Kellogg P~ct, as would ttinsure 
of the p:rinci.ple of l'eaoefu.l sattl.ement .of in:ternatioru1l 
disp11tes.n2:9 The next dny, Secretary St:Lmson gave the 
.J~p:r:tnese Junbff:1.s.aador a note ex,pressing doap ccmcern over the 
.,. • +• 30 ftpp_1ca.1,1.on nf force .• 
Tha United States Government was 2lso ln close t?uch 
·wi.tn the aativi ties ot the Le~gue through: 




'"9 6 · Senate Docu.nient 55, 72 Cong., p. 3 (hereafter re-
f'e:rre.d to ns 7'2 Dong., S .. Doc. 55). This senate dom.rn:rent 
is the eompilation .of the correspondence of the Department 
of Stf1te regarding the :Manehurit:1.n question from Septembel:', 
1931., to J'ianuary 1.6 , 1932. 
30 Ibid .. ,· n1J. 4-5. 
~ .,..._,., . 
p. 
t,he erto.rts or the Leagu~ vouna.il to b.rb1g about. a eessat1011 
of u.;iatlli ties. Oa Deeenih~r 10 the Ootuiail decided upon 
~.itizen .ot ':'i,he 'Onited ~}tat.$$ ~~hoS;J gova:rnr1t~nt had s,trongly· 
endo:it2iad the Council' a de.Q:isiou to .a;p;point '~b.e C&if~isa:1w1 .. 32 
tJ6lp.an co!ltinued uiitll Ollinehovl, the last unoi~Ul)ied oity, 
tell.. L11rG~!iately thar\1'.tatt.~r, ;j:O ;ranu.i.l"Y ·1, 19!:52. ::leei•etary 
'BI.rt in view of th:a present i5ituatiou and. o:r i·~s 
tlw.n rights iand. obligati.ons tbtirein,, the .me.ric9,11 
r:t01.-rerri..>u~n:rt- d.$~.rw it t;o be :tts duty to n-ot1f'y both the 
Gove~~nt o.t the Chinese Refublio and the lm:periQl 
;J'0;pem,a11@ U:over11Ji1e11t 1fhat it oannot ,\:..o.ntit- tl1a le;-ulity 
of any satu~ttion 4$ facto n.Dr dO$S it inte:nd to 
:re@o{;f;ni:3e uJ1y 'tr·eat)1' or a&l*ee311;int enta:red ir.rto be ... 
tW4'G tb,e two govermniu1ts, or agents thereof'_, w)lic!a 
rMr:, i1:l1)ai;r tlae treaty ri~b.ts er tl1~ Un1t~l1.i Ststas or 
its ~itizens in 'Ghin~1,. inelud:lng tltlose whlon relate 
t.~ tJ:1e a~veria1.g.n.ty, tb.1 J i11de1,H1n:1~1eru1e ,. 01· the tet·1~1-
tor1al an<'i oo.m!n:tst:rati.ve integrity Qf the ~epublie 
or Obin.u, or to ttl:e i;ntern!:ztiou;!i.l poliey 1·elativ,a to 
China, tlomm.only knO"ll\1n as, the open-door policy; and 
that it does not lnt$;"1d to rec~gntze any situt>.t1on, 
\ra&ttf or agreem.ent which rtie.1 be brouv!ht about 'by 
1Itaan~ eontracy t.Q ·the covanants ~d. oblitti:itions or 
the Fact ot ?aria ct August 2? t 19.28, to which treat;y 
both_ .. Chitl_i. :!'¢i]s\$,U ,1:tSc {?ell as the Uni te,:t iStiitea ~~ 
partle.s ... 3"" 
Thi.s n®•reeop1.th,n ,p0>li.07 ls ltSttally rcete.·rr~d to ~s the 
Japan's .reply .of ,January 16 denied any lnto.ntian ot 
acquiring territory or of lntertering with the open-doo.r 
policy. As to the i:mpairt.'lent of tretrty obligations J'apan 
It .might be the subjeet of an aaaderrJ.o doubt, 
whether in a given ease the improprietr ot means 
necessarily and !tlws.ya avoids the ends secured but 
as Japan !las no intentions ot a4o,pting improper 
maan.s, that question do1~s not praotioally arise. 
, la.pan insi tad that shri:) ht;1.d been ro:rccerl to t'.l!te some 
tempoTa:r:r control beoauze qt tho ehaot.1e c:>ndi tions of' the 
looal government .. 54 
A month vre.nt by without any important developmant ot 
v1aa made by .J11pan u1mn t3h:9Jlghai January 29, atte:r, which 
Chin.a ag11i:n invoked tne Coven6l.n.t .c,f the League.. On frebruary 
1 16' the aouno.11 addressed a note to Japan aocusing her o'f 
territorial inte§Jrity ;;ind,exiatin.g polltieal independence 
1of' all .t,!erebers of the League) 0 ought to be recognized •35 
Even yet, the Council .had nart made :1 oomplete pled,1e 
of non-reoognition, tor it was unable to bind the other 
34 r·"' JI:. ,, . · .. , i::::- ~ £!. ~- • pp. ,o;:,-.-.,~ .. 
35 Coope~, ,_.i'~e~i.e!!l ponsultation !!!. :?{9:rl.~ Affairs, 
p. 259. 
Le.ague members.. The note was important chiefly because it 
indicated a sterner atti.tude toward .rapan.,3& 
This stranger attitude was considerably eneouraged by 
letter to Senator Bo~a.b., Ch.airw:Jl1 ot ·the SenHte Com:m.ittee 
on Foreign Relations, February 23,. frankly a..'11.d fearles:sly 
setting forth the policy ot the United. Statea. !nit he 
reminde,1 Great :Britain that she llad also supported the 
open-door p·olioy in the Iline-Power Treaty of 1922, he charged 
that tllat treaty ns v.;ell as the Kellogg Paot had been 
violatea..·37 Finall.y i he in.vi ted world-wide support of his 
non-reoognit1on doctrine by saJring: 
If a similar d.ec.5.sion should be reaohed 3.l'td a 
sindlar posit:iou te.ke:n by the other governments ot 
the world a ea.veat will be placed upon such aetion 
wilioll, we believe, will effeotively bar the legali-
ty hereafter of any title or ri~ht sought to be 
obtained '.by pressure or t1"'eaty 1tiols.tion, and w1l1ch, 
as has been shotun by history in th" past, Will even-
tually lead ·to 'i.lte 1:estor!lltion to Ohin~ or· righj~ 
and titles of whioh sbe may have bet~n de!)riv~d., 6 
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On r~eh 11 the Assembly of the League voted unanimously, 
exeapt for fa.pan's and Ohin;1;1."s .failure to vote, to accept 
the Hoover-Stimson doc-tri11e of non-reeogni tion or the trui ts 
59 o.f aggression. 
'%~ 
vv Ibid .. , p. -
37 Heru.·y L. 2tit'!..\:lC:tt, 'it'Lettcr of Gec:cetary- of St.ate 
Stimson to Senator Borah,. 11 International. Concil.iation., 
No ... 285 { Jauuc.ry, 193Z} , 18-£1. · · · · 
00 1·'\~ ' A · ~ ") .i..11.r... .. ' p. I,;,&;., .. -
39 Cooper, ,?troeri(Hil'l Consult,::rciou on r!o;;lu ;,!'fairs) 
p. 251. 
Atter arch ll there were no further hostilitie,s or 
im.portance, and on ay 5, in accordance with the .Assembly's 
resolution, the representatives ot China, J"apan, Great. 
Britain, ranee, Italy and the United States proceeded to 
sign an armistiee agreement. On May 31 the l ast ot the 
Japanese expeditionary forces sailed fro Shangha1.40 
During the summer ot 1932, while awaiting the report 
of the Lytton Commission, ali parties -worked to strengthen 
their military and diplomatic positions. Puring :ugust 
America, Japan, and China in turn stated the policies which 
they eipected to follow in the Far East. 41 
In his address to the Council of Foreign Relations 
Secretary Stimson declared that the old ideas of neutrality 
are obsolete; that an act or war 1n one part of the . orld 
1s of vital interest to every co.untry.; that the Briand-
Kel.logg Pa.ct 1s a vital treaty; that the United States 
would not recognize illegal gains; and that consultation 
between signatories was necessary when the Paot was 
threatened.•2 President Hoover indioated pertect agree-
ment th the Secretary ot State in his speech three days 
40 Ibid., p. 253. -
•1 Ibid., pp. 254-255. 
42 Henry L. Stimson. 1tStatement of the Secretary ot 
State, AUgust 8, 1932," .International Conciliation No . 
286 {January, 1935). 24-3!. 
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later. 43 
Jap n detend d her recent recognition of the independent 
t te or lanchukuo; denied responsibility tor recent mili-
t ry ctivities in anchur1, and diaclain:ed any intention 
ot annexing territory. She claimed that her lita.ry activi-
ties had been prompted by self'-d fense and held tat her 
ction snot in violation of the Kellogg-Briand ot . 
~ pan further st ted her 7~r ~astern olicy bus: 
It goe ·ithout s ying that Jnpan, al ays 
conscious of the gener~l interests of the Far =ast 
·111 pre no ettort to fford 11 oa ible assis-
tano& to China. Indeed , it 1s my fervent hope that 
tho day is not far distant when Japan , . 'anehukuo, 
an China, as three indep ndent powers closely · 
11nke together by the bond of cultural and racial 
e.f'tin:1 ties, ·111 come to cooper te h nd in hand, tor 
th a.int nanoe and dvanoe nt or tlle peao nd 
prosperity ot the Fr ~ast as ell as tor nthe peace 
of the ,orl and tho eiv1.llz tion of mankind. tt4'!-
Dr. Lo ,en- Ken denounced tl1e action of J pan in China 
as contra.r to the !Jlti - ~iar Paot. He danied tlla t there as 
any .c.ove ent 1 l.!anchu1"i a fo1. independence fro Chin ex-
cept that pon ored by J pan. He further at ted: 
her ill b no peace und roap rity int e 
three ea tern provinces until all Japanese troops 
have coen rl t rawn fro place here they have no 
right to appe r u:nd unt~l. the Chinese Government 
45" oerpt fro resident Hoover's Presidential 
oirJ.na.tion .. ~ec ptP co Cpeech , l ugust 11, 9 2," International 
Conoiliation ro. 285 (January, 1933), 33. 
44 "Addrens of Count Uchida, inister for "" oreign 
fairs , at the Third esaion or the Impereal Diet, August 
25, 1932 ,tt Intern~tion. 1. Oonoil1ation o. 286 (J'anu ry, 
1933} 1 34-40. 
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regaini5control over the land now temporarily lost to us. 
Dr. Lo ien-Ken emphasizes the imp·ortant points of 
Ohinese policy in the following state ents: 
l. Neith~r the Chinese Government nor the 
Chinese people entertain the least anti-foreign 
feelings. However, in Tlew or the present state 
of affairs produced by Japan's military aggre.ssion, 
it would be absolutely impossible tor the Chinese 
people to express the most cordial friendly senti-
ments to the Japanese people. It entirely rests 
with Japan herself to improve and restore relations 
between the Chinese and Japanese people. 
2. China will neTer surrender one inoh or her 
territory nor any or her sovereign rights under 
stress ot military force which she condemns and is 
determined t-o resist ta th.e best or her ability. 
3. China will never agree to any solution ot 
the present situation which t kes into account the 
puppet organization in the Three astern Provinces 
established, maintained, and controlled by the 
lapanese litary rorees. 
4. China is confident that any reasonable pro-
posal to.r the settlement of the present situation 
will be necessarily oo patible w1 th the letter and 
spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 
Anti- War Pact, and the Nine-Power Treaty, as well 
s with China's sovereign power, and will also 
etteclgvely secure everlasting peace in the Far 
East. 
The Lytton Commission gave its'report to the Counoil 
of the League of iations on October 2. The report consis-
ted or ten chapters. The t'irst eight traced the background 
or the oo·nflict, the interests involved, nd. the m111 tary 
45 "Speeeh Delivered by Dr. Lo Wen-Ken, inister ot 
Foreign At:t'o.1:rs t Nank1ng, at the Veekly emorial SerTice 
or Dr. Sun Yat- en on August 29., 1932," International 
Conciliation No •. 286 (January, 1935), 41-45. · 
46 ~., p. 44. 
88 
developments hile the last two proposed principles and 
conditions of settlement. It denied in the first plaoe 
that J pan was acting wholly on the detensive in her Man-
churian policy, thus implying a violation of the anti-war 
treaties. Furthermore, its id that anchukuo could not 
ha.Te been formed w1 thout the activities ot apanese offi-
cials, both eivil nd military. Thererore, the new state 
oould not have been considered to have been called into 
existenoe by a genuine and spontaneous independence move-
ment. The Commission did not deolare inf vor of a restora-
tion or the status quo ~ nor maintenance of the present 
state of anchukuo. In view ot these T1ndings the other 
League members did not accept J' pan's invitation to recog-
nize the independent state.47 
Japan did not aece_pt the report :favorably; subsequent 
negotiations tailed to deter her trom an aggressive policy 
in the Far a.st and on February 24, 1933, $he announced her 
'.· " 
intention to withdraw from the League of ations. Present 
activities in China indicate that she has not changed her 
policy • 
.Another case whioh involved consultation among the 
signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact was the Leticia 
attair. On September l, 1932, eru seiz d the town. or 
Leticia, hioh belonged to Columbia. At first the matter 
47 Cooper, 
_p. 257. 
erican Consultation !! rforld A.t'tairs, 
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was considered merely as a r ebellion, s1nee only civilians 
participated. 48 Yet, 1n spite of oommit.ments by both 
gc,vernments, Peru soon changed .her att1 tude and rallied to 
the support ot the Letio1an invaders. Columbia was asked 
to retrai:n from recapturing Leticia on the .ground that 
toroetul aetion would inevitably injure innocent Peruvian 
interests. Peru added that the trouble as due to ttuncon-
trollable national a sp1r·tions.tt40 
.on January 23, 1933, the Columbian Government sent 
notes to the United States and other signatories of the 
Briand-Kellogg Pact asking them to remind Peru that she s 
violating the Paet in using :f'oroe to support improper and 
inexcusable acts of aggression in the territory of a friendly 
nation. e cited Columbia's note ot January 11 requesting 
Peru to retire its military toroes trom Columbian territory 
and to permit the legitimate a.uthori ties to reestablish 
order without a elash.50 
,hen Secretary Stimson received the Columbian note he 
immediately got busy. On TUesday evening, .January 24, he 
i nvited to his hoe the ambassadors o:f' Great Britain, France, 
Ita ly, Germany, and Japan. This method or calling the 
powers together for eonsulta tion was new in its application 
to the Pact.. Heretofore they had been consulted separately. 
48 ew York 'l'imes, Septe ber 4, 1952. ----=----
49 ~., September 18, 1932. 
50 Ibid., January 24, 1.;35. 
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Vhile ~timson was consulting with the Qreat Powers, Francis 
White, the sistant ~eoretary of State in charge of Latin 
American Affairs, was consulting 1th the Latin American 
represente:tives. 'In neither meeting were thre ts suggested, 
rel! oe . being plaoed v holly upon the eight of Public 
Opinion. 51 
The outgrowth of the deliberati~n w s a-note rrom 
Secretary Stimson to the Peruvian Government di patched 
January 25. It reviewed the case ot eaoh party and as a 
warning remarked that violation or the Pact would entail 
a deni l or he benefits furnished by 1 t. 
noted that: 
lnally he 
The American nations further declare that they 
rould not reoogni.ze the validity of territor1 1 ao-
quis1t1ons which might be obtained5!brough occupa-tion or conquest by force or arm$. 
The Council of the League ot ...,ations sponsored condi-
tions similar to these mentioned in Secretary Stimson's 
note and after some negotiations a satisfactory settlement 
w s reached in wb.ieh Leticia was returned to Columbia. 53 
The tcict that erio ts note aroused greater resent-
ment against the United States than against the League 
served to cast doubts upon the advisability of· consultation 
51 Cooper, 
pp. 303-504. 
erican Consultation 1!! World A:f~airs, 
52 New York Times , January 25, 1933. -- · 
53 Cooper , ~ erioan Consultation!!!. _____ _ tt"airs, 
p. 337. 
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and· intercession under the Kellogg Pact in preference to 
such action unde.r the author ity and established procedure 
ot the League ot Nations . ter this the United States 
orked through the Leo.gue. 54 
he Ethiopian-Italian disput ... deserves mention here, 
not because of any etteot which the Briand- Kellogg Pact had, 
but because ot its lack ot effect. General Smuts has said: 
It Js impossible to conceive or a simpler or 
clearer case of violation or both the Covenant and 
the Paris Peaoe Pact. The League has unanimousl% 
tound against Italy and round her the aggressor.~5 
'When the Emperor or Ethiopia on July 3, 1935, appealed 
to the ~ er1can Government to examine means of securing ob-
servance of the Pact ot Paris he received the answer, that 
as the League of Nations was giving its ttention to the 
controversy it was hoped that a satisfactory decision would 
be reached. '11he erioan note con~luded with the following 
encouraging sentence: 
Furthermore, and of great importanee 1~ view 
of the provisions of the Paot of Paris, to which 
both Italy and Abbysinia are parties, in common 
with 61 other countries, my Government would be 
lonth to believe that either of them would resort 
to other than pacific means as a method of dealing 
1th the controversy or would permit any situation 
to arise hieh ould be 1noans1stent 11th the com-
mitments of the Paot .56 
54 Ibid . , p. 340. -
55 41ehol s urray utler, The Familf or N tions {New 
York: Charles Scribner's ~ons, 1938), p.147 
56 Depart ent of St te, Press Release, July 6, 1935, 
Pllblieation No. 757, p. 29. 
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On September 13 the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. 
denied th t the United States h d abandoned the Kellogg 
Pact 1n the Ethiopian ea~e. He mentioned to the Italian 
Govern.c.ent that he hoped th t means 1'1ould soon be found ror 
a mutually satisfactory solution of the problero.57 
0.n August l President Roosevelt issued the following 
statement: 
At this moment, when the Council of the League 
ot at1ons is assembled to consider ways tor co -
posing by pacif'ic eens the dif'terenoes that have 
arisen between Italy and Ethiopi a, I wish to voice 
the hope of the people and the Government of the 
United States than an amicable solution will be 
tound and that peace will be mainta.ined .58 
On Septe ber 3 the United States Government, upon dis-
covery of an agency granting coxnmeroial concessions mioh 
added to the difficulties took measures to rem.ove that ob-
stacle to peaceful settlement.59 in the erican Govern-
ent asked the countries to consider the declaration or the 
pledge they had given in the Fact ot Paris. 60 
that happened to -thiopia is no secret. Her emperor 
is in exile, a nd she has been proclaimed and is no · a part 
of the Italian Empire. 
at is the i portance of the Briand- Kellogg P ct? 
57 Ibid.. , September 14-, 1936; bli.oe.tion No ?84, 
p. 195. - . 
58 Ibid., :P• 195. -
69 Ibid., p . 196. -
60 ~., p. 196. 
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What has been its significance? r as it merely a st temen~ 
or ideals~ The answers to these and numerous other similar 
questions will vary widely. All that can be done here is 
to attempt to picture its probable lace in -1story. There 
can be little doubt th tit has not met the expectations 
of its authors , yet it has probably had re influence than 
some ori tics will admit. It is sj.gnificant tha.t li"r nk B. 
Kellogg was · ardod tho Nobel rrizo in 1929 for his otiv1-
t1ea in behalf of vror ld .P aoe. 
There are sixty-three nations 1hich under the Kellogg 
Pact have renounc d war as an instrument of thoir national 
policy and agreed to settle their disputes by pacific means. 
However , since the Pact has gone in t .o effect nations have 
continued to increase their a rmament and med conf11ots 
still break out. /',; 1 f 
The, Conference of the Internation 1 Law Association 
hioh met in Budapest in l,Jeptember of 1934 recognized the 
Pact as a vital force . The following interpretations were 
given to the Pact: 
l. Sign tory State cannot by denunc1 tion 
or non-observance of the Pact, release itselt trom 
1ts obligations thereunder. 
2. signatory state whiob threatens to re~ 
sort to ar ed force tor tha solution o.r n inter-
national dispute or conflict is 3uilt1 of~ viola-
1!.9.!! of the Pact. 
3. ~ sign tory State which _ill~ violatiM 
state thereby itselr violates the Pact. 
4. In the event of a violation or the Paot by 
a resort to armed force or war by one signatory 
State against another, any signatory St te, not 
S4 
being a party to the original dispute,~. without 
therebz committing breach of the Pact or or any: 
rule or International law, doall oraiiyotthe 
roIIowI'ng tiiings: -
{a) Refuse to dmit the e:xerc1se by the State 
violating the Paet of belligerent rights, suoh as 
visit and search ot blockade, eto. 
(b} Decline to observe to ards the State viola-
ting the Pact the duties prescribed by international 
la , apart from the Paet,. tor neutral in relation 
to a belligerent. 
(o) Suppiy the State attacked with finano1al or 
m terial assistance, including munitions of war. 
(d) Assist with ar ed forces the State attacked. 
5. The signatory States are not entitled to 
reoognize as acquired~ .1ure any territorial or 
other advantages acquired S!.. taoto by means or a 
violation or the Pact. 
6. A violating State is liable to pay compensa-
tion ror all damage caused by a violation or the 
Pact to any signatory State or to its nationals. 
7. The Pact does not affect such humanitarian 
obligations as are contained 1n general treaties 
such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the 
Genev Conventions or 18&4, 1906 and 1929, and the 
International ConventioR1relating to treatment or 
Prisoners o'f · ar, 1929. 
In addition to the tioles of Interpretation, the 
toli.owing Resolutions were passed: 
1. That a violation or the Pact, being a 
matter which concerns the interests or all the 
signatories, should entitle them to insist that 
their interests be safeguarded in the subsequent 
Treaty of Peace. 
e,i Lord Ho-ward ot Penrith, "International Law or 
International Chaos," International Conciliation io. 308 
(Maroh, 1935), 83-45. (Lord Howard or Penrith was the 
British Ambassador at 'lashington when the :Briand-Kellogg 
Pact was signed.) 
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2. That the signatories or the Pact should 
forthwith refuse and prohibit aid to any state 
commencing or threatening to commence recourse to 
armed torce and which retuses or tails, on the 
demand of any signatory St te, to submit the mat-
ter in dispute to the Permanent Court or Inter-
national J"ustice or to some other agreed Tribunal 
tor final determination. 
3 . That the principle be reatfirmed that it is 
the duty ·of all States 1th.out delay to erect such 
domestio legislation as may be required to oarry 
into ~ifect any Treaty obligations entered into by 
them. 
These Interpretations and Resolu~ions may go too tar, 
but at least the Paet is 1tl2portant as a declar tion to the 
world that the policy of war was one that nations would 
not pursue; t.hat the United States was placed in a better 
position to cooperate with the other nat1ons 7 and that the 
treaty was less important than the Trea~y of Looarno be-
cause it laoked sanctions. 03 
The tact that the Budapest Articles received little 
attention indicate that people are no longer interested in 
it. They do not consider it as a living thing, yet it is 
probably destined to play an important part in world poli-
tics in the interest or peace. or course, it could remain, 
unfortunately, as only a pious idea having no practical 
etteet .. Another interpretation which might be plaoed on 
the Pact is that ea ch signatory is responsible onl7 for its 
62 Ibid., p. 84. -
63 Lord kwith, "The Meaning or the Paet or Paris, 11 
Debate in the British House ot Lords, February 20t 1935 1 
International Conciliation No. 510 (May, 1935}, 164. 
own oonduot. 64 
The Briand-Kellog Pact serves with other treaties as 
the basis of American Foreign policy . On July 12. 1;35, 
the Seoretary of State issued the fol1Qw1ng statement: 
The Pact ot Paris is no less binding now than 
when 1t was entered into by the &5 nations that ar 
parties to it. By form and designation 1t consti-
tutes treaty by and among those n tions. It is 
a declaration by the governments ot the world that 
they condemn recourse to war for the solution or 
international controversies, and renounce it as an 
instrument or national policy in their relations 
with o.ne another . Furthermore, it is an agreement 
and .a solemn oblig tion that the settlement or 
solution of all disputes or conflicts among nations, 
of whatever nature or or whatever origin, shall 
never be sought except by pacific means. 
The United St tes and other nations are in-
terested in the maintenance or the pact and the 
sanctity of the internation 1 commitments assumed 
thereby tor the promotion and m~intenanoe of peace 
among the nations of the · rld . 65 
The Kellogg Paot came about as a result of aroused 
public consciousness ag inst the horrors of the iorld 1iar, 
but it seems that time soon causes people to forget. Never-
theless, despite the discouraging international outlook, 
there is a steadily 1ncreasing desire for peace . In the 
~es tern Hemisphere Roosevelt' a policy has reattirmed the 
Briand-Kellogg Pact. though at times the situation seems 
disoouraging, the world is still advancing "along the road 
64 Lord Howard of Penrith. Ibid., pp. 15&-167. 
05 Department of' State, Press Release, J'uly 13, 1$~35, 
Publication No. 758, pp. 53- 54. 
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laid down by the negotiators or the Paot of Paris."66 
On October 6, 1937, the United States Department ot 
State called attention to the necessity tor maintaining the 
principle of the Bri nd-Kellogg Paet and indicted Japan 
as a violator ot both it and the Nine-Po er treaty f 1922.&7 
Japan denied violation of either or these tre ties, con-
tending that China's ti-Japanese policy incited by Red 
influence was to bla.me.66 
In regard to the violation ot a treaty by .a: nation, 
it is ditficult in some oases to determine the aggressor. 
The determination by this Government of whe-
ther or not an action by a.nother nation is 1n fact 
a violation of an obligation assumed under treaty 
or agreement to which both that n tion am the 
United States are parties, and the expression of 
ol)1n1on on the part or this Government that such 
violation has taken plaoe must necessarily be 
governed by the circumstances of the occasion. 
The United States Government has been frank to ea.11 
attention ~o any alleged v1ol tion. 59 
ain the Secretary or 3tate called attention to the 
fact that the outbreak ot hostilities anywhere in the world 
is a d1stur~ing factor and that the people of all nations 
66 Ibid., ugust 28, 1957, Publication lilo . 1060, 
pp. l84-Ie'57 
67 "Statement or the Fr Eastern Crisis Issued by the 
Department or State , October 5, 1g37,n International Con-
ciliation No . 334 (November, 1957), 716-717. -
68 Statement or the Japanese Government, October 9, 
192?, ~-, p. 720. 
69 Department o~ State , Press Release, April 26, l928t 
Io . 197. 
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desire peace under all o1rcumstanoes. The Pa.ct or Paris 
therefore is eonsidered .bindi.ng on all parties. '10 
It might be interesting to note that from a. legal 
standpoint even though the Pact may have been violated, no 
war has been otfioially declared since its inauguration. 
Neither has any nation threatened to withdra in ravor or 
aceepting war as a part of its national policy. 
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